Page:The Air Force Role In Developing International Outer Space Law (Terrill, 1999).djvu/21

"President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Gen Nathan F. Twining, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles

In drafting its space policy, the Eisenhower administration demonstrated an ambivalent desire to be first in space. Such ambivalence by Eisenhower was not unique to outer space but was generally the hallmark of Eisenhower’s approach to problem solving, particularly and ironically regarding issues relating to foreign affairs.^[1] For example, Eisenhower pursued a space-for-peace policy and proposed to rely upon nonexistent “nonmilitary” boosters as the launch vehicle. As drafted by Air Force secretary Donald A. Quarles,^[2] this policy declared that the IGY satellite program would not interfere with intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missile (ICBM and IRBM) programs. The US satellite would be launched for “peaceful purposes” and would assist in establishing the right of unimpeded overflights in outer space.^[3] This decision was confirmed by the National Security Council (NSC Directive 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on US Scientific Satellite Program) on 26 May and approved by President Eisenhower on 27 May 1955. However, the administration did not immediately communicate this decision to themilitary services,^[4] one of which was to be assigned to manage the development of the boosters.^[5]

By pursuing a space-for-peace policy, President Eisenhower, at least publicly, began a persistent effort by his administration to marry space

1. For amplification of this point, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1984).
2. Quarles served as assistant secretary of defense for research and development from September 1953 to August 1955. He then served as secretary of the Air Force from August 1955 to April 1957 and became deputy secretary of defense in April 1957 and served in that capacity until May 1959.
3. Spires, 41
4. Some historians assert that the Navy, which eventually was selected to manage the development of the nonmilitary booster, was aware of this NSC decision when it submitted its proposal for developing these boosters to the NSC for approval while the Army and Air Force were not. “USAF Space Programs,” 12.
5. “USAF Space Programs,” 12-13; Hall, “Origins,” 22-23; and Bowen, 57-83.