background material and advice on a desirable United States position was made available to briefing officers and used by them in briefing selected Canadians.” Colonel Dayharsh noted that the “Canadian viewpoint coincides with that approach to the question recommended [by Hensleigh]” and that all issues had been satisfactorily resolved.[1]
The Soviets launched Sputnik I on 4 October 1957 and Sputnik II in November. During the several months before the launchings, “there was furious activity on the Air Staff on space matters.”[2] The Air Staff was preparing for an Air Force space launch of a “civilian” satellite at Cape Canaveral.[3] During this time, the legal ramifications of the launch were being studied, particularly the issue of whether an orbit over another country would violate its sovereignty. The JAG’s International Law Division advised the Air Staff to the effect that there was no answer to the sovereignty issue “because no spacecraft had ever been successfully launched and no international agreement existed on the subject.”[4] Neither practice nor treaty was yet in effect.
Having learned of the Soviet’s successful launch and orbit of Sputnik, several Air Staff members rushed to the office of General LeMay, the vice chief of staff. Having briefed him on the Soviet launch, they questioned him as to whether the US should protest given that by Sputnik’s overflight of the United States the Soviets had violated US sovereignty. He responded, “We were going to orbit their country weren’t we?”[5] His reply ended any Air Force-initiated protest of the Soviet launch.[6] Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles observed, “the Russians have done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space…Eisenhower…looked ahead and asked about a reconnaissance vehicle [satellite].”[7] During a news conference on 9 October 1957, Eisenhower hinted at his stalking-horse agenda when questioned regarding Sputnik. He stated, “From what they
- ↑ Col T. J. Dayharsh to Howard E. Hensleigh, DOD assistant general counsel (international affairs), memorandum, subject: Canadian Understanding of United States Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Plans as They Concern Canada, 12 September 1957.
- ↑ Carroll, 2.
- ↑ As noted earlier, by the mid-1940s, there was already significant interservice rivalry seeking to capture the space program. Indicative that this rivalry continued well into the 1950s. Air Force vice chief of staff General LeMay would state on 17 March 1959 that “while recognizing Army and Navy interest in aerospace projects, we would seek to limit their participation to a coordinating role.”
- ↑ Ibid., 2-3.
- ↑ Ibid., 3.
- ↑ General LeMay’s position was clearly in accord with Eisenhower’s thinking. Whether General LeMay was advised as to the stalking-horse strategy or separately came to the same conclusion is unknown. If he had been advised, General LeMay apparently had not shared that insight with others in the Air Force such as Generals Donald L. Putt and Richard M. Montgomery, both of whom, as discussed below, took much different positions.
- ↑ R Cargill Hall, “Origins of US Space Policy: Eisenhower, Open Skies, and Freedom of Space,” Colloquy (December 1993), 23. Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books. 1985), 134.
