Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume I.djvu/775

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ARMY 739 fantry, but capable of maintaining a position. They were of little importance until after the Peloponnesian war, when Iphicrates reorgan- ized them. The light troops of the Athenians enjoyed a high reputation for intelligence and quickness both in resolution and in execution. On several occasions, probably in difficult ground, they even successfully opposed the Spartan phalanx. The Athenian cavalry was introduced at a time when the republic was already rich and powerful. The mountainous ground of Attica was unfavorable to this arm, but the neighborhood of Thessaly and Boeotia, countries rich in horses, and consequently the first to form cavalry, soon caused its introduc- tion in the other states of Greece. The Athe- nian cavalry, first 300, then 600, and even 1,000 strong, was composed of the richest citizens, and formed a standing corps even in time of peace. They were a very effective body, ex- tremely watchful, intelligent, and enterprising. Their position in battle, as well as that of the light troops, was generally on the wings of the phalanx. In later times the Athenians also maintained a corps of 200 mercenary mounted archers (hippotoxotce). The Athenian soldier up to the time of Pericles received no pay. Afterward two oboli (besides two more for provisions, which the soldier had to find) were given, and sometimes even the hoplita3 received as much as two drachms. Officers received double pay, cavalry soldiers threefold, generals fourfold. The corps of heavy cavalry alone cost 40 talents (about $40,000) per annum in time of peace, during war considerably more. The order of battle and mode of fighting were extremely simple. The phalanx formed the centre, the men locking their spears and cover- ing the whole front with their row of shields. They attacked the hostile phalanx in a parallel front. When the first onset was not sufficient to break the enemy's order, the struggle hand to hand with the sword decided the battle. In the mean time the light troops and cavalry either attacked the corresponding troops of the enemy, or attempted to operate on the flank and rear of the phalanx, and to take ad- vantage of any disorder. In case of a victory they undertook the pursuit ; in case of defeat they covered the retreat as much as possible. They were also used for reconnoitring expedi- tions and forays, they harassed the enemy on the march, especially when he had to pass a defile, and they tried to capture his convoys and stragglers. The phalanx always operated as a whole ; its subdivisions into smaller bodies had no technical significance ; their command- ers had no other task than to see that the order of the phalanx was not broken, or was quickly restored. At the beginning of the Pe- loponnesian war, the Athenian army mustered 13,000 hoplitae for field service, 61,000 (the youngest and the oldest soldiers) for garrison duty, 1,200 horsemen, and 1,600 archers. Ac- cording to Bockh's calculations, the force sent against Syracuse numbered 38,560 men, and reinforcements despatched afterward, 26,000. The ruin of this expedition utterly exhausted the resources of Athens. Sparta was preeminently the military state of Greece. The Spartans di- rected their attention mostly to strength, endu- rance, and hardiness. They valued steadiness in the ranks, and military point of honor, more than intelligence. As long as the phalanx decided the battle, the Spartan in the long run had the best of it. In Sparta every freeman was en- rolled in the army lists -from his 20th to his 60th year. The ephors determined the num- ber to be called out, and they were generally chosen among the middle-aged men, from 30 to 40. As in Athens, the men belonging to the same tribe or locality were enrolled in the same body of troops. The organization of the army was based upon the confraternities (eno- motiai) introduced by Lycurgus, two of which formed a pentecostys ; two of these were uni- ted into a lochos, and eight or four lochi into a mora. This was the organization in Xeno- phon's time ; in former periods it appears to have varied. The strength of a mora is vari- ously stated at from 400 to 900 men, and their number at one time was said to be 600. These various bodies of free Spartans formed the phalanx ; the hoplitse composing it were armed with a spear, a short sword, and a shield fas- tened round the neck. Later on, Cleomenes introduced the large Carian shield, fastened by a string on the left arm, and leaving both hands of the soldier free. The Spartans con- sidered it disgraceful for their men to return after a defeat without their shields; the pres- ervation of the shield proved the retreat to have been made in good order and in a compact phalanx, while single fugitives, running for their lives, of course had to throw away the clumsy shield. The Spartan phalanx was gen- erally eight deep, but sometimes the depth was doubled by placing one wing behind the other. The men appear to have marched in step; some elementary evolutions were also in use, such as changing front to the rear by facing the men about, advancing or retiring a wing by wheeling, &c. ; but they would seem to have been introduced at a later period only. In their best times, the Spartan phalanx, like that of Athens, knew the parallel front attack only. The ranks on the march were distant from each other six feet, in the charge three feet, and in a position receiving the charge only a foot and a half, from rank to rank. The army was commanded by one of the kings, who, with his suite (damosia), occupied a po- sition in the centre of the phalanx. After- ward, the number of the free Spartans having considerably decreased, the strength of the phalanx was kept up by a selection from the subjected Perioeci. The cavalry was never stronger than about 600 men, divided into troops (ulami) of 50 men ; it merely covered the wings. There was besides a body of 300 mounted men, the elite of the Spartan youth, but they dismounted in battle, and formed a