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H2 CAVALRY cavalry to be well in hand, and perfectly under the control of its commanders. Irregular levies are incapable of it. Ptolemy, who commanded the advanced guard of Alexander's army, could make no headway until the Macedonian cuiras- siers passed the river, and charged the Persians in flank. A long combat ensued, but the Per- sian horsemen, being disposed in one line with- out reserves, and being at last abandoned by the Asiatic Greeks in their army, were ultimately routed. The battle of Arbela (331 B. C.) was the most glorious for the Macedonian cavalry. Alexander in person led the Macedonian horse, which formed the extreme right of his order of battle, while the Thessalian horse formed the left. The Persians tried to outflank him, but in the decisive moment Alexander brought fresh men from the rear so as to overlap them in their turn ; they at the same time left a gap between their left and centre. Into this gap Alexander at once dashed, separated their left from the remainder of the army, rolled it up completely, and pursued it for a considerable distance. Then, on being called upon to send assistance to his own menaced left, he rallied his horse in a very short time, and passing be- hind the enemy's centre fell upon the rear of his right. The battle was thus gained, and Alexander from that day ranks among the first of the cavalry generals of all times. And to crown the work, his cavalry pursued the fugitive enemy with such ardor that its ad- vanced guard stood the next day 75 miles in advance of the battle field. It is very curious to observe that the general principles of cav- alry tactics were as well understood at that time as they are now. To attack infantry in the formation of the march, or during a change of formation ; to attack cavalry principally on its flank; to profit by any opening in the enemy's line by dashing in and wheeling to the right and left, so as to take in flank and rear the troops placed next to such a gap ; to follow up a victory by a rapid and inexorable pursuit of the broken enemy these are among the first and most important rules that every cavalry officer has to learn. After Alexander's death we hear no more of that splendid cavalry of Greece and Macedon. In Greece infantry again prevailed, and in Asia and Egypt the mounted service soon degenerated. The Romans never were horsemen. What little cavalry they had with the legions was glad to fight on foot. Their horses were of an interior breed, and the men could not ride. But on the southern side of the Mediterranean a cavalry was formed, which not only rivalled, but even outshone that of Alexander. The Carthaginian gener- als, Hamilcar and Hannibal, had succeeded in forming, besides their Numidian irregular horsemen, a body of first-rate regular cavalry, and thus created an arm which almost every- where insured them victory. The Berbers of north Africa are still a nation of horsemen, at least in the plains, and the splendid Barb horse which carried Hannibal's swordsmen into the deep masses of the Roman infantry, with a rapidity and vehemence unknown be- fore, still mounts the finest regiments of the whole French cavalry, the chasseurs cTAfriqite, and is by them acknowledged to be the best war horse in existence. The Carthaginian in- fantry was far interior to that of the Romans, even after it had been long trained by its two great chiefs ; it would not have had the slightest chance against the Roman legions, had it not been for the assistance of that cavalry which alone made it possible for Hannibal to hold out 16 years in Italy; and when this cavalry had been worn out by the wear and tear of so many campaigns, not by the sword of the enemy, there was no longer a place in Italy for him. Hannibal's battles have that in common with those of Frederick the Great, that most of them were won by cavalry over first-rate infantry ; and, indeed, at no other time has cavalry per- formed such glorious deeds as under those two great commanders. From what nation, and upon what tactical principles, Hamilcar and Hannibal formed their regular cavalry, we are not precisely informed. But as their Numid- ian light horse are always clearly distinguished from the heavy or regular cavalry, we may con- clude that the latter was not composed of Berber tribes. There were very likely many foreign mercenaries and some Carthaginians ; the great mass, however, most probably con- sisted of Spaniards, as it was formed in their country, and as even in Crosar's time Spanish horsemen were attached to most Roman armies. Hannibal being well acquainted with Greek civilization, and Greek mercenaries and soldiers of fortune having before his time served under the Carthaginian standards, there can scarcely be a doubt that the organization of the Grecian and Macedonian heavy cavalry served as the ba- sis for that of the Carthaginian. The very first encounter in Italy settled the question of the su- periority of the Carthaginian horse. At the Ti- cinus(218B. C.), the Roman consul Publius Sci- pio, while reconnoitering with his cavalry and light infantry, met with the Carthaginian cav- alry led by Hannibal on a similar errand. Han- nibal at once attacked. The Roman light in- fantry stood in first line, the cavalry formed the second. The Carthaginian heavy horse charged the infantry, dispersed it, and then fell at once on the Roman cavalry in front, while the Numidian irregulars charged their flank and rear. The battle was short. The Romans fought bravely, but they had no chance what- ever. They could not ride ; their own horses vanquished them ; frightened by the flight of the Roman skirmishers, who were driven in upon them and sought shelter between them, they threw off many of their riders and broke up the formation. Other troopers, not trusting to their horsemanship, wisely dismounted and attempted to fight as infantry. But already the Carthaginian cuirassiers were in the midst of them, while the inevitable Numidians gal- loped round the confused mass, cutting down