Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume IX.djvu/782

762 KANT Kant to show that we are not warranted in transferring to the soul, as an objective and immortal existence, those predicates which we apply to it as a matter of subjective conscious- ness; or, that the abstract demonstration of immortality, from the nature of the soul, in- volves paralogisms. Rational cosmology (or the sum total of the phenomena of the world, reduced to unity) leaves us in kindred contra- diction as to the external world. On purely rational grounds (applying the four categories), we land jn absolute antinomies, or contradic- tions : 1, as to quantity, we can equally prove that the world is limited and unlimited ; 2, as to quality, that its elements are both simple and infinitely divisible ; 3, as to relation, that it is caused by a free act, or by an infinite series of mechanical causes; 4, as to modality, that it has an independent cause, and that its parts are only mutually dependent. These antino- mies, as thus developed by Kant, bring out distinctly the contrast between the infinite and the finite, between the absolute and the rela- tive. The force of them consists in viewing the world, on the one hand, as related to the infinite and absolute; on the other hand, as related to the finite and relative. Kant's solu- tion of them is found in his position, that the categories have subjective but not objective validity. But the antinomy in each case re- sults from applying to one and the same sub- ject (viz., the world) at the same time both infinite and finite properties, making it both absolute and relative, which of course involves us in contradictions. These antinomies show us that reason is weak in constructing the rela- tion between the infinite and finite, between the absolute and relative ; but not that reason may not know the real being of both. In the same manner, in his " Rational Theology," the various proofs of the being of God are dis- cussed, and shown to be invalid, viz., the onto- logical, the cosmological, and the physico-theo- logical. The ontological argument confounds an analytic with a synthetic judgment ; the cosmological is only another form of the onto- logical; and the physico-theological does not prove the perfection or infinitude of the Deity. Thus on grounds of pure reason, in relation to our highest ideas, we are left in the position of being unable to demonstrate their objective validity. Yet still they are " postulates," " ne- cessary illusions;" we are obliged to take them as " regulative " principles. We cannot prove them, nor yet can the materialist or skeptic disprove them; that is, theoretically, we can neither admit nor deny them. This criticism does not lead, he claims, to skepticism ; it only shows us the bounds of reason ; in fact, it car- ries us over into that sphere where reason lias an authentic and decisive voice, that is, the sphere of the practical reason, the sphere of final causes or ends. Thus may be solved, for practical purposes, the problems which to the pure reason are simply insoluble. The metho- dology, which forms the second chief part of this " Criticism of the Pure Reason," gives the rule by which reason may and ought to be guided, so that it shall not, for example, apply mathematics to incongruous subjects, nor con- found the theoretical and the practical. In the second of Kant's criticisms, that of the " Practical Reason," the unsolved problems are taken up under a different and positive point of view. His works on the " Metaphys- ics of Morals " and the " Metaphysical Ele- ments of Law and of Virtue" are devoted to the same general theme. His general position is this: theoretical or pure reason gives us certain postulates, which on merely theoretical grounds cannot be proved to have a valid be- ing ; or, in other words, it gives certain prob- lems as to the soul and its immortality, as to the unity of the cosmos, and as to the being of God, which it cannot itself resolve. But where theoretical reason is silent, practical reason speaks with authority. The sphere of this practical reason is the will ; and here is where reason unfolds its whole power and signifi- cancy. The practical reason is thus the high- est spiritual power in man ; it has the " pri- macy " over all the others, even over the pure reason. This practical reason or will now acts, and must act, according to certain laws or principles. Some of these principles are merely subjective, or "maxims;" others have an imperative character or universal validity. These make the " categorical imperative," which is the decisive word in Kant's ethical theory. The moral law is such a categorical imperative ; and this is a dictate of reason it- self ; the so-called moral sense is not the source, but the product, of this superior moral law. The formula of this moral law is : " Act only on such a maxim as may also be a universal law;" or, "Act in reference to rational beings (thyself and others) as if they were ends in and for themselves, and not as if they were mere means to an end." If, now, we know and are under such an absolute law, then we must be free; such a law is possible for us only as we are free in the strictest or trans- cendental sense. This is the "autonomy" of the will ; it is a law unto itself ; what I ought to do I must be able to do. If the moral law be real, freedom must be real ; and that free- dom which the pure reason left as a problem is thus proved to be a reality. Still further : if there be such a moral law, there must be a moral world, and in that world the highest good must be brought about by means of the moral law. But as a matter of fact, we find that each individual is still imperfect, under the dominion of sense ; that virtue is never fully realized here. But it ought to be, it must be realized ; and this realization can only be ef- fected in an endless duration of the soul ; the soul, then, must be immortal. Yet again, per- fect happiness is essential to the highest good ; but this happiness can only be realized when nature and morality are in entire harmony and unison. As a matter of fact they are not so ;