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260 NEUTRALITY ity to furnish one only of two hostile parties with ammunition or other war supplies, pro- vided this be done in accordance with previous treaty stipulations. Thus, by the treaty of 1788 with the United States, France secured the exclusive privilege of asylum in American ports for her privateers and their prizes. But in this case, as usually, such a qualification of neutrality, though clearly sanctioned by the law of nations, did not fail to provoke complaint and protest from the less favored power. It is not consistent with a neutral character to concede to one belligerent, to the exclusion of others, the liberty of raising land or sea forces within the neutral territory. This privilege the United States refuse to all belligerents alike, and the prohibition is declared by a per- manent act of congress ; and any attempt by a foreign power to obtain enlistments in this country would be regarded as an unfriendly act, and if aided or connived at by its diplo- matic representative would be deemed a justi- fication of a demand for his recall, as in the case of the British minister, Sir John Cramp- ton, in 1855. The perfect inviolability of its territory is the clearest if not the chief among the rights of a neutral state. A belligerent therefore cannot attack his enemy on neutral ground, and, in spite of a condemnation by a prize court of the captor, the neutral power will restore to its owner property captured within its jurisdiction. The neutral may re- fuse to all belligerents the privilege of passage over its domain, or must grant it, if at all, to all alike. It may forbid the entrance of war vessels and their prizes into its ports, although, in the absence of positive prohibition, the lib- erty to enter is implied. Our government has uniformly conceded this favor to the public ships of the hostile powers, without their prizes. To admit the entrance and sale of these in neutral ports is a favt>r which, in the opinion of eminent authorities, is hardly con- sistent with perfect neutrality, or with the dic- tates of true policy. As an illustration of modern practice in this respect, it may be added, that in the Crimean war Sweden and Norway and Denmark, adopting the same rules of neutrality, admitted into their ports the ships of war and of commerce of the belliger- ent parties, and accorded to them the facility of supplying themselves with all necessary stores and provisions not contraband of war, but forbade, except in cases of distress, the entrance, condemnation, or sale of any prize in any of the harbors of these kingdoms. Whether the neutral can claim territorial im- munity for its ships, whether in other words its flag shall protect the whole ship and cargo from the assertion of belligerent rights, has been a much vexed question in international law. The treaties concluded at Utrecht in 1713 had embodied the principle that the character of the vessel should determine that of its cargo; and though the same principle had been introduced into frequent conventions, based upon these treaties, to which England had been a party, yet this power always refused to admit that express stipulations of this nature could change what it called the common law of nations in the premises. Except, therefore, when it was bound by special compacts, Eng- land has steadily maintained the integrity of the rule that enemy's goods on board a neutral ship are good prize of war. In 1781 the Baltic code of neutrality was first proclaimed by Catharine II. of Russia. One of its most prom- inent articles asserted the principle of the treaties of Utrecht, namely, that free ships should make free goods. The principal powers of Europe, excepting only England, acceded to the Russian rules of neutrality. The single influence of England against the code, however, was too great to be withstood, and it was abandoned in 1787. An attempt to revive it in 1801 was equally unsuccessful, and for the same reason. In its general jurisprudence the United States has, almost of necessity, adopted the English rule. But in its treaties, and particu- larly in those with American powers, it has generally inserted the more liberal principle that neutral ships shall make free goods. Since 1786 England had generally asserted her bel- ligerent rights, until after the beginning of the Crimean war, by a common declaration with her ally France, promulgated in April, 1854, she announced that for the present she "waived her right of seizing enemy property laden on board neutral vessels, unless it were contraband of war." At the conclusion of the war England gave a more formal assent to the principle which she had so long opposed ; for the declaration which was signed at the con- gress of Paris in 1856 by the plenipotentiaries of all the great powers, contained the provision that the neutral flag shall cover enemy goods, with the exception of those contraband of war, and it may be supposed has fixed the maxim in the law of nations. The rule usually coupled with that just referred to, though the two have really no connection, namely, that neutral goods, except contraband, are not liable to cap- ture though laden in enemy ships, is also in- cluded in the declaration of the congress of Paris. It was formally rejected by France, but other nations have generally observed it. Subject only to slight and reasonable restric- tions, the neutral may carry on its commerce with the hostile powers. But plainly it must not furnish either with war supplies, nor in- deed with any material which can directly con- tribute to the prosecution of hostilities. In the familiar phrase of the international law, its ships must not carry contraband. Further, they must neither break blockades, nor carry despatches for either party, nor in any other mode render direct assistance in the war. Fi- nally, neutral ships must be always ready to prove themselves that which they profess to be, and must therefore be provided with papers sufficient to prove their nationality, and must submit to" a reasonable exercise of the right