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1899.] Negative Boer Beply. [191

That was no disloyal majority ; it had voted 30,000Z. a year as a contribution to the Imperial Navy. When pressing these demands it was common sense to go hand in hand with the majority in that great colony. Mr. Schreiner and his col- leagues had tried to persuade the High Commissioner that this was not the time for ultimatums. The Dutch Eeformed Church resolved the other day that a war of aggression would be a most serious shock to the allegiance of her Majesty's Dutch subjects. People talked, said Mr. Morley, of a per- manent settlement. Permanent settlements were not such an easy matter ; the natural course of events would make for the supremacy of England, but the sword would not help them.

Mr. Courtney, who followed, said that he hailed with satis- faction the latest despatch of Mr. Chamberlain. It was a re- buke to the fire-eaters, and a rebuke, most of all, to one whom he must designate as a lost mind — he meant Sir A. Milner. He wished Paul Kruger could control his Boers sufficiently to induce them to accept the proposals of that document. The Boers had promised to submit the case to arbitration, and he should say accept arbitration. But could that meeting believe that Paul Kruger could persuade his Boers to accept this or any other similar proposition unless they found some assurance that in England and from Englishmen they would receive fair play and honourable judgment ?

The net result of the Manchester speeches and resolutions apparently was that the British demands were just and reason- able, and fairly expressed, but that it would be unwise and wrong to press them by force, at any rate for an indefinite period, if the Boers persistently refused to concede them. But the preponderant feeling in the country was that England was responsible for the weal of South Africa, and was bound in honour to secure ordinary civil rights to her sons in that region even, if necessary, by force. This attitude was strengthened by the publication of the Transvaal's reply to Mr. Chamberlain's despatch.

Dr. Beitz's communication (Sept. 16) was practically the conclusion, on the Transvaal side, of the protracted negotia- tions. It virtually conveyed a charge of bad faith against the British Agent at Pretoria, if not against the British Cabinet, by the statement that "the proposal which has now lapsed, con- tained in the letters of this Government of August 19 and 21, was induced by suggestions given by the British Agent to the State Attorney, and these were accepted by this Government in good faith, and, on express request, as equivalent to an assurance that the proposal would be acceptable to her Majesty's Govern- ment." Having next dwelt on the even dangerous magnitude of the concessions it had been willing to make, the despatch proceeded : " Inasmuch, however, as the conditions attached to the proposal, the acceptance of which constituted the only con- sideration for its offer, have been declared unacceptable," the