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FOREIGN HISTORY.
[1899.

military and political situation. Moreover, the armed strength of Germany had now been developed to such an extent and it reposed on so secure a basis that they could, perhaps, shake off nervous apprehensions and face the future with equanimity. Yet history taught them that the will of the mightiest monarchs was not able to alter the interests of a great nation or the conditions of its existence. If a nation meant to maintain its independence, it must possess the strength requisite for protecting its interests at any moment. If he looked around him in the world he found that nowhere had there been a cessation of preparations for war. On the contrary, in view of the additions to the armies and navies of other nations the measure before them might well appear to be inadequate. Trusting, however, to the constant improvement in the quality of the Army, the Government had ventured to confine itself to its present proposals with regard to strength. The wars of recent years had taught the great lesson that everything favoured the side which had most carefully and longest prepared for war, and had kept pace with the developments of modern science in its armament. He referred particularly to the wars between China and Japan and between the United States and Spain, and also to the operations of the Anglo-Egyptian forces in the Soudan. One of the new measures introduced by the bill was the institution of three new army corps, and the War Minister explained that this was essentially a question of effective organisation. It had become clear that, in the event of war, the armed strength of the country would have to be divided into small armies, and even these small armies could not be handled with effect unless they were so organised that their management was not hampered by unwieldy masses like overgrown army corps. Now they had several army corps which were excessively strong, and the minister proceeded to justify in detail the new organisations and their territorial assignment for strategic and administrative reasons to Bavaria, Saxony and Hesse-Darmstadt. He next defended the proposed increase in the Prussian cavalry, which had remained stationary in point of numerical strength for thirty years. In spite of the assertions of many theorists that the importance of cavalry in modern warfare had diminished, he must insist that, in view of the cavalry masses beyond their frontiers, they must make themselves stronger in this arm. Turning to the contemplated increase in the artillery, tactics had undergone a great change since the time of Napoleon, whose plan was to keep masses of artillery in reserve to decide a doubtful battle. Now-a-days, it was imperative that the artillery should play an effective and extensive part in the combat from the very beginning, and that it should in all cases form, as it were, the "skeleton" of the line of battle. To be effective in this fashion the artillery must have a thorough and serviceable organisation, for they could not trust to improvisations at the eleventh hour. He