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and that this would be the case in any territory newly acquired, by purchase or by war, as of Mexico on the South or Canada on the North.
And here I begin by the remark, that as the assumption of constitutional law is inspired by the assumption of fact with regard to the "ennobling" character of Slavery, so it must lose much if not all of its force when the latter assumption is shown to be false, as has been done to-day.
When Slavery is seen to be the Barbarism which it is, there are few who would not cover it from sight, rather than insist upon sending it abroad with the flag of the Republic. It is only because people have been insensible to its true character that they have tolerated for a moment its exorbitant pretensions. Therefore this long exposition, where Slavery has been made to stand forth in its five-fold Barbarism, with the single object of compelling men to work without wages, naturally prepares the way to consider the assumption of constitutional law.
This assumption may be described as an attempt to Africanize the Constitution, by introducing into it the barbarous Law of Slavery, derived as we have seen originally from barbarous Africa; and then, through such Africanization of the Constitution, to Africanize the Territories, and to Africanize the National Government. In using this language to express the obvious effect of this assumption, I borrow a suggestive term, first employed by a Portuguese writer at the beginning of this century, when protesting against the spread of Slavery in Brazil. (See Koster's Travels in Brazil, vol, ii. p. 248.) Analyze the assumption, and it will be found to stand on two pretensions, either of which failing, the assumption fails also. These two are — first, the Af rican pretension of property in man; and, secondly, the pretension that such property is recognized in the Constitution.
With regard to the first of these pretensions, I might simply refer to what I have already said at an earlier stage of this argument. But I should do injustice to the part it has been made to play in this controversy, if I did not again expose it. Then I sought particularly to show its Barbarism; now I shall show something more.
Property implies an owner and a thing owned. On the one side is a human being, and on the other side a thing. But the very idea of a human being necessarily excludes the idea of pro-
