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of Massachusetts, who all concurred with Mr. Gerry; and especially of Mr. Madison, of Virginia, who, mm mild juridical phrase, "thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution hhe idea that there could be property in man." And lastly, as if to complete the elaborate work of Freedom, and to give expression to all these utterances, the word "servitude," which had been allowed in the clause on the apportionment of Representatives, was struck out, and the word "service" substituted instead. This final exclusion from the Constitution of the idea of property in man was on the motion of Mr. Randolph, of Virginia; and the reason assigned for the substitution, according to Mr. Madison, in his authentic report of the debate, was, that "the former was thought to express the condition of slaves, and the latter the obligations of free persons." Thus, at every point, by great national declarations, by frank utterances in the Convention, and by a positive act in adjusting the text of the Constitution, was the idea of property in man unequivocally rejected.
This pretension, which may be dismissed as utterly baseless, becomes absurd when it is considered to what result it necessarily conducts. If the Barbarism of Slavery, in all its five-fold wrong, is really embodied in the Constitution, so as to be beyond the reach of prohibition, either Congressional or local, in the Territories, then, for the same reason, it must be beyond the reach of prohibition or abolition, even by local authority in the States themselves, and just so long as the Constitution continues unchanged, Territories and States alike must be open to all its blasting influences. And yet this pretension, which, in its natural consequences, overturns State Rights, is put forward by Senators, who profess to be the special guardians of State Rights.
Nor does this pretension derive any support from the much debated clause in the Constitution for the rendition of fugitives from "service or labor," on which so much stress is constantly put. But I do not occupy your time now on this head, for two reasons — first, because, having already on a former occasion exhibited with great fullness the character of that clause, ] am unwilling now thus incidentally to open the question upon it; and secondly, because, whatever may be its character — admitting that it confers power upon Congress — and admitting also, what
