that the historian shall consciously seek to present the truth and nothing but the truth. He must not deliberately suppress or distort facts to favour (say) the Protestant or the Roman Catholic view of the Reformation. A modern historian may be convinced that sin leads to disaster, but he must not therefore write that a certain wicked monarch perished dethroned and in misery, if he knows that he died peacefully in his royal bed. If he wishes to enforce the doctrine that "the wages of sin is death," either he may turn to history and select incidents which support that view, or he may invent characters and weave them into a tale which points his moral, or he may discuss the belief generally; but he ought not to publish as serious history a work in which, irrespective of facts, every wicked king is punished or involves his land in ruin. We should count such a work an illegitimate use of historical material, unless the author gave some clear indication of its real nature. We draw a sharp distinction between history and fiction, and in the serious historian we demand fidelity to the truth as he sees it.
This modern standpoint is in reality the outcome of that more scientific habit of mind which insists above all things on accurate observation of phenomena and on the subordination of theory to fact. But the duty of scientific thinking has not so very long been recognised by the human mind, and in former days many things were legitimate and natural which would not be so now. The moment we make allowance for our mental environment, we can conceive that there might be other ideas than our own as to what constitutes the use and abuse of historical records. To us the facts are primary, and the lessons they seem to teach must be accepted, whether they suit our wishes or not. But an ancient writer was not dominated by that maxim. Supposing he desired to teach that "Virtue is rewarded," he might consider that an excellent way of enforcing his theory was not only to use the narratives of the past, but to mould and modify them as best suited his object. History might be made the tool of his conviction, and the tool be shaped to assist his purpose. If it is hard for us to realise
