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THE CONVENTION AT BIRMINGHAM
149

THAT A SACRED MONTH WILL BE NECESSARY to prepare the millions to secure the Charter of their political salvation, they will FIRMLY resolve to abstain from their labours during that period, as well as from the use of all intoxicating drinks?

3. Whether, if asked, they would refuse payment of rents, rates, and taxes?

4. Whether, according to their old constitutional rights, they have prepared themselves with the arms of freemen to defend the laws and constitutional privileges their ancestors bequeathed to them?

5. Whether they will support Chartist candidates at the General Election?

6. Whether they will deal exclusively with shopkeepers known to be Chartists?

7. Whether they will resist all counter and rival agitations?

8. Whether they will refuse to read hostile newspapers?

9. Whether they will OBEY ALL THE JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUESTS OF THE MAJORITY OF THE CONVENTION?[1]


These "suggestions" betray great perplexity on the part of the Convention. Compared with the incisive character of the prefatory address, they make an almost ridiculous impression. They rest largely upon the ill-founded assumption that the Chartist enthusiasts were everywhere a majority amongst the working people. They follow the tendency already noted, to place the responsibility for extreme measures and their consequences upon the shoulders of the rank and file instead of the leaders. Behind all, there seems to lie a hope that these suggestions, by bringing the more reckless and unthinking Chartists face to face with stern realities, might have a sobering effect and put an end to the possibility of conflict altogether. The appeal to arms now takes a secondary place and the economic weapons, the general strike, a run on the banks, and boycotting, are put into the first place.

The manifesto and the "ulterior measures" were not adopted without great division of opinion. Lovett and Harney were its chief defenders—a curious alliance. Lovett thought it was the most honest and courageous step to take. The Convention ought not to go on postponing the decision; it ought to give a lead to its followers even at the cost of some sacrifice. Harney was sure it would precipitate the long-wished-for conflict.[2] There was strong opposition from Halley, Cleave,

  1. Charter, May 19, 1839, p. 258.
  2. Place Bays Harney opposed the Address on this very ground (Additional MSS. 27,821, p. 175), but I prefer my own reading of the matter.