midst of Paradise. In these things, certainly, it is not right to prefer our thoughts to the sentence of the teachers. In these things neither the command of prelates nor their prohibition is to be in all cases spurned." And further on, Bernard says: "Faith, hope and love are absolutely good, and other things of this kind; and they may not be either forbidden or not kept. Absolutely evil are sacrilege, adultery, theft, and such like, which certainly may neither be properly enjoined nor done, and they may not be improperly not[1] forbidden and not done. For no one's prohibition is valid to set aside precepts, and no one's commandments are valid to prejudice in favor of things forbidden.
"Then there are the things intermediate, which indeed of themselves are not known to be either good or evil. They may, however, indifferently be either good or bad; they may be commanded or forbidden, but under no circumstances are they to be obeyed by inferiors, when they are evil. Among these are, by way of example, fasting, vigils, reading and such like. But it should be known that certain things intermediate go beyond the reason of things impure or evil. For since marriage may occur or not occur, but when once entered into it is not permissible to undo it, what, therefore, before marriage was permitted to be, as a thing indifferent, obtains in those already married the force of the absolutely good. Likewise, it is a matter indifferent for a secular man to possess private property, because he has the option of not possessing. But for a monk, because he is not permitted to have possessions, to possess goods is an absolute evil." Thus much Bernard.
Also it is to be noted that, so far as the sense of those speaking about human actions goes, a certain work is called neutral among them which, in its primary intent, cannot be said to be a good of morals or an evil of vice, as, for example, to build or to weave. But works are called good or evil
- ↑ Huss has improperly inserted this "not" which is not found in Migne.
