have been received by the body of the clergy in Prague, and they have obeyed them, therefore, they ought to be obeyed." It is as if we should argue in this way: because processes were received by the body of the clergy in Jerusalem against Christ, that he is a seducer, malefactor, and blasphemer excommunicate and guilty of death, therefore, those processes are to be obeyed by the doctors themselves. The conclusion from the law of similarity holds by that middle term of cause, "because the processes were received by the clergy"—and the doctors of theology ought to be ashamed for that conclusion, and especially Stanislaus, for he is the ablest logician amongst them. Perhaps they learned that conclusion from the chief priests, scribes, and Pharisees who formulated a like conclusion. For when Pilate said unto them, "What accusation bring ye against this man?" they answered and said (formulating this conclusion): "If this man were not an evil-doer we would not have delivered him up to thee," John 18:29–30. And again they followed the same line of argument when Pilate said, "I find no case against him," when they replied, "We have a law and according to that law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God," John 19:7. In the first conclusion, formulated by the Jews, the doctors implied that they themselves did not err when they said: "If this one were not an evil-doer, we would not have delivered him up to thee"—that is, because he is an evil-doer, therefore have we delivered him up to thee. Similarly our doctors reply in the conclusion they formulate that the body of the clergy in Prague cannot err; otherwise, if they were able to err, their conclusion would not be valid. And because that body is able to err in accepting the processes, so also it does err in securing them and wickedly executing them. Therefore, the conclusion of the doctors is not a good one.
And I wonder how this enormous conclusion—cauda—of the doctors, by which they wish to cover up their shame by
