of the plebs in 494 B.C.; certainly there is none of which the results were so strange and far-reaching. Nor is there any known fact which brings before us so clearly the contrast of privileged and unprivileged in a City-State, or the distinctness with which the Romans conceived this contrast. We see here the almost absolute separation of noble from ignoble, of the members of the ancient clans from the population which had grown up outside them. For these tribunes had nothing to do with the State as a whole; they were not magistrates of the State; they had no seat in the Senate; they were not even cives optimo jure. They had no direct hold upon the policy of the executive and its council. They were simply officers of the plebs, and, so far as we know, their powers were limited to the protection of plebeians against the action of the State and its magistrates. And this protective power could only be exercised within the city and a mile beyond its walls; against the imperium militiæ, the absolute power of the consul in the field, they were quite powerless. Within the walls, if a plebeian called upon them to help him, the patrician magistrate must withdraw his lictors; but in this negative sense only could they bring influence to bear upon the imperium.
But what guarantee could there be that the magistrates would respect the interference of these plebeian officers? There must be some special bond to secure this respect, for the nature of the office suggested none of itself. The tribune was elected without auspicia, and no religious sanction protected him such as protected those who were responsible
