44 PROPERTY IN LAND.
of the human mind are themselves unconsciously subject to those very laws. The Duke appeals to moral percep- tions for the same reason that impels all men, good or bad, learned or simple, to appeal to moral perceptions whenever they become warm in argument ; and this reason is, the instinctive feeling that the moral sense is higher and truer than the intellectual sense; that the moral faculties do more certainly revolt against iniquity than the intellectual faculties against absurdity. The Duke appeals to the moral sense, because he instinctively feels that with all men its decisions have the highest sanction ; and if he afterward seeks to weaken its authority, it is because this very moral sense whispers to him that his case is not a good one.
My opinion as to the relative superiority of the moral and intellectual perceptions is the reverse of that stated by the Duke. It seems to me certain that the moral facul- ties constitute a truer guide than the intellectual faculties, and that what, in reality, we should never forget, is not that the moral faculties are untrustworthy, but that those faculties may be dulled by refusal to heed them, and distorted by the promptings of selfishness. So true, so ineradicable is the moral sense, that where selfishness or passion would outrage it, the intellectual faculties are always called upon to supply excuse. No unjust war was ever begun without some pretense of asserting right or redressing wrong, or, despite themselves, of doing some good to the conquered. No petty thief but makes for himself some justification. It is doubtful if any deliberate wrong is ever committed, it is certain no wrongful course of action is ever continued, without the framing of some theory which may dull or placate the moral sense.
And while as to things apprehended solely by the intel- lectual faculties the greatest diversities of perception have obtained and still obtain among men, and those percep-
�� �
