sistance, and colour sensations, or that the phenomenal qualities indicated by them, do in our experience fuse. That is, these sense-phenomena are, as they come, not yet individuals, since they are not even necessarily exclusive. Just so, the local signs of touch and vision fuse into the presented place of the thing in the complex called outer space, the colours and their local signs suggesting the local signs of possible touches. Thus the local signs are universals; for they, too, do not even exclude one another so long as they belong to different senses. The concrete thing A is now a more complex union of fused universals than it was when one considered merely the field of vision. As such fused group of universals, it now excludes, or renders impossible, certain other combinations. The colour-quality a, in combination with the touch-quality b, and with the present or suggested local signs of sight and touch, c and d, now proves to be such that, so long as a and b are linked with c and d, no other colour-and-touch group, a' and b' — or, as we concretely say, no other thing A' — can get this same group of local signs, or, as we also say, can get into the same place which A occupies. But by such combinations we define everything except what constitutes the true individuality of A. We define A as a certain combination, or fusion, of universals, which is repugnant to or exclusive of various other combinations of universals. And that is, so far, all that we do. It is precisely as if we said: “I cannot at the same time attend to the melody A and to the entirely unrelated melody A'.” In such a case, our mutually exclusive melodies are not yet defined as
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SUPPLEMENTARY ESSAY BY PROFESSOR ROYCE
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