in any respect mutually independent, or that they should be independent, in any respect, of the rest of the constitution of the Absolute Will, — this does not demand the segmentation of the interests I and I’ , as “things in themselves,” or as otherwise transcendent realities, from one another, or from the rest of the universe. Such freedom demands only, that in the individuation of the universe, as it is, the interests which are expressed in the other individual lives and facts of the world shall not, by virtue of the constitution of the world of ideas, absolutely predetermine how the interest I, as such, shall either formulate or express itself, and that the same relative independence shall hold of any other interest I’, such as gets expressed in the life of a free individual.
Herein, as asserted above, lies the essence of the solution of our antinomy. And I offer the solution, not merely as a polemic, but as a suggestion towards reconciliation. I see not why the ancient and to my mind rather superstitious objection to Idealism,[1] which has received so skilful a formulation in Professor Howison’s discussion, should longer be regarded as any essential obstacle in the way of a rational philosophy.
My further answers to Professor Howison’s objections may now take a less irreconcilable tone than would otherwise be necessary. My argument is taxed with a certain “solipsistic” tendency. The
- ↑ [No, not to Idealism, but to Idealistic Monism. Professor Howison submits that calling this objection — that Monism is irreconcilable with the self-activity indispensable in a moral world — a “superstition,” is indeed a striking novelty, be the objection as “ancient” as it may. — Ed.]
