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Clause proposed to the National Society for consideration is twofold.
1. To guard the religious instruction of Church of England scholars in its entirety from all interference.
2. To provide for the instruction of the children of Dissenting parents in such schools, being the only schools within reach, consistently with the rights of conscience."
And he closes his letter with a similar appeal:—"It must always be borne in mind that the Conscience Clause does not touch the religious instruction; it concerns only those Dissenting parents who may wish to withdraw their children from such instruction when it is contrary to their own belief."
I shall venture to express plainly my firm conviction that Mr. Lingen's letter, far from making the justification of the clause harder, puts the justice of it in a clearer light than it has ever been placed in before.
For it brings out the main fact that the practical object and intention of the clause is one, and one only. That single purpose is to authorise the withdrawal from religious instruction in Church of England schools of scholars whose parents are not members of the Church of England. More than this it neither does nor pretends to do by any positive provision. It leaves the religious instruction in Church of England schools, which is otherwise prescribed in the trust deeds framed by the Committee of Council, absolutely and entirely untouched. It is this effect of it which induces Mr. Lingen to say that the first object of the clause is "to guard the religious instruction of Church of England schools in its entirety from all interference." This is the result of the action of the clause,[1] and the statement
- ↑ I must confess that Mr. Lingen's description of it as the primary object of the clause is fully borne out by Lord Granville's evidence before the late committee. Nothing is so manifest from that evidence
