is customary among us that decisions on public matters depend more on the unanimous will of the people than on the power of the King.’
It is of course open to question whether such a statement is genuine and to what extent it reflects reality. But it clearly indicates that the idea of Sweden being a constitutional state has a long tradition. In Swedish history, demands for a separation of powers, or constitutionalism, have gone hand in hand with demands for a written constitution.
Sweden has had a written constitution valid throughout the nation since the mid-14th century, when the Landslag, the National Law of King Magnus Eriksson, was drawn up. The Royal Statute of the National Law lays down rules governing the election of a King, his duties, his right to levy taxes under certain conditions and the right of the people to participate in decisions concerning taxes, the election of councillors, and the functions of the Council of State. The Royal Statute corresponds to our modern Instrument of Government.
Swedish popular representation, known as a Riksdag or Diet from the late 1500s, developed from meetings to elect the King and the local taxation boards that were stipulated in the Royal Statute. It also developed from meetings of powerful men which could be extended to comprise all politically influential groups. As in many other European countries these groups consisted of the nobility, the clergy and the burghers, but a group that was unique to Sweden was the free land-owning peasantry. The Riksdag did not hold meetings regularly or on its own initiative, but was convened by the King when necessary. In the 16th and 17th centuries, despite this lack of independence, Parliament came to play an increasingly important part in the life of the State. Sweden’s first Riksdag Act was enacted in 1617. It ensured that the monarch led the work of Parliament.
In the 16th century, Sweden became a hereditary kingdom, and for this reason decisions of various kinds were added to the Royal Statute: these included succession pacts affecting the succession to the throne (the first in 1544), royal wills (the first in 1560) and royal accession charters (the first in 1594).
Opinions were sometimes divided, however, as to the feasibility or advisability of applying the constitutional form of government prescribed in the National Law. Until 1809, there was a continuous struggle between the champions of autocratic rule and those who advocated the National Law’s insistence on a separation of powers.
Gustaf II Adolf’s 1611 Accession Charter represents a capitulation on the part of the throne, but nonetheless the King still made most of the decisions in his Government. When the King died in 1632, regents were appointed to act for Queen Christina. Sweden’s first Instrument of Government was enacted in 1634 for the guidance of the Regency Government. It was drawn up by Axel Oxenstierna, one of the foremost statesmen in Sweden’s history. This Instrument of Government, which did not supersede the Royal Statute, may be regarded as largely a statute of administration. In many respects, Swedish administrative traditions go back to the 1634 Instrument of Government.
When another long regency was at hand in 1660, it was decided that government should be conducted in accordance with the 1634
