profit by Allied intervention. Adhering strictly to this principle the Allies were unable to support or acknowledge either the Siberian Government or the Government of the Directory; they could not tell whether they were strong governments enjoying the confidence of the nation. And on the contrary these governments even with the best programs were never able to grow strong and to win the confidence of the people, because they were not acknowledged or supported by the Allies. The result of this misunderstanding was a vicious circle without a starting-point; it is bound to result in new revolutions, each of which will quite naturally mean new strengthening for bolshevism; for the fact is that all the changes of government were explained by Bolshevik propaganda as being reactionary and dangerous to democracy. This brought into the ranks of Bolsheviks masses of the left socialists who otherwise would not have joined the Bolsheviks at all.
It was the general expectation that the conclusion of the world war would deal the Bolsheviks a deadly blow; it was stipulated in the conditions of the armistice that Germans must withdraw their prisoners of war from Russia. That seemed to deprive the Bolsheviks of the aid given them by their organizers—German officers.
But the result was the very opposite: German prisoners of war and organizers remained in the ranks of Bolsheviks by securing Russian citizenship. On the other hand German troops evacuated Russian territory, where they had not permitted Bolshevik disorder; of course this territory was immediately occupied by Bolsheviks with all the well-known results of such occupation: murder, robbery and forcible mobilization into the ranks of the Red Army. The final result of it will be strengthening of the Bolshevik position.
Experience has shown that the principal of non-interference with Russian internal matters, applied by any intervention what ever, is absolutely impracticable and is not even in accordance with the wish of the Russian people. On the contrary they would like a much more active intervention with direct influence by the Allies on the development of Russian internal matters, but upon one condition only: it must be made clear that all the Allies are co-intervening and acting in accordance with an exact pre-arranged plan and further that the final scope of the intervention is openly declared. That would put a stop to calumnious like the prevailing conviction that the Allies were intent on supporting some one political party.
A Russian has difficulty in understanding the point of view of American and European democracies. According to incomplete information reaching us from the outer world, the democracies of the Allied states have declared against any intervention in Russia. That such a decision might result from a supposition or belief that the Bolsheviks, too, are democrats no Russian democrat will at present be able to understand, because today it is clear to every political infant in Russia that the Bolsheviks have nothing in common with true democracy. How then shall we explain the reluctance of the Allied democracies to intervene in Russia now, when the same democracies as long as the war continued favored intervention? During the war intervention in Russia meant a weakening of the western front; at this time it means an offer of help extended to the suffering Russian people in the name of humanity.
The Russian nation follows with a lively interest, but at the same time with a harsh feeling of bitterness, all the efforts for creating the League of Nations; it comprehends with difficulty, how the Allied democracies can entertain this noble but rather distant idea and at the same time look with unconcern at what is going on in Russia. A Russian democrat cannot readily comprehend how the Western democratic states can negotiate with the Bolsheviki; he knows well that it is quite silly to speak in this late day of the Bolshevist ideal, for the Bolsheviks themselves have murdered the leaders of ideal Bolshevism. High sounding words of right, justice and humanity are flying from all sides to the frozen wilderness of Siberia, but they sound in the ears of the Russian people like sneers and awake distrust and despair.
Allied assistance to the Russian people in Siberia has hitherto been furnished chiefly in a material form. Undoubtedly Russia needs material assistance, supplies of arms, money and of course chiefly and first of all reorganization of railroads. This last question is the most important one, as the Siberian railway line which half a year ago still worked satisfactorily is at present completely out of commission. One important reason for it is lack of money. Me-
