important operation as the first serious bombardment by an ironclad squadron may be of interest.
There has been rather a tendency to depreciate this engagement by dwelling on the weakness of the defence. Much is made of the fact that no submarine mines were used to keep the ships at a distance, that the guns on shore were weak and badly served, and that under totally different conditions the fleet could not have succeeded. It seems unnecessary to discuss what might have been, or we could reply that no special arrangements had been made on the side of the attack, no mortars provided, and the ships that took part were not all the most powerful we possessed. The fact, however, remains that the batteries were silenced, and the guns deserted, showing that the admiral in command had accurately estimated the force necessary to produce this result. But these batteries may well have been considered as formidable. About twelve in number, they were distributed along the coast commanding the approach to Alexandria Harbour. They mounted over 200 guns, of which about forty were rifled, while the remainder were smooth bores. Except for the penetration of armour, the latter were capable of inflicting heavy damage on the assailants.
The attack was to be made by eight armoured ships, carrying less than 100 guns so arranged that in many cases only one side could be brought to bear at a time. That some of the guns threw projectiles infinitely larger than could be returned from the shore did not give a corresponding advantage to the ships, because it has usually been found that number, rapidity of fire, and
