us. I see a triple naval bulwark, composed of one fleet acting on the enemy's coast; of another, consisting of heavier ships, stationed in the Downs, and ready to act at a moment's notice; and a third, close to the beach, capable of destroying any part of the enemy's flotilla that should escape the vigilance of the other two branches of our defence. As to these gunboats, which have been so strongly recommended, this mosquito fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can be employed. I have lately seen half-a-dozen of them lying wrecked on the rocks. As to the probability of the enemy being able, in a narrow sea, to pass through our blockading squadrons with all that secrecy and dexterity, and by those hidden means that some worthy people expect, I really, from anything I have seen in the course of my professional career, am not disposed to concur in it.' Lord St Vincent was equally emphatic that preparation should be rather directed to keeping the enemy as far from our coasts as possible, and attacking them the moment they come out of their ports, than to awaiting them at home.
It is only when the fleet has been suffered to decline from motives of economy that misdirected attention is turned to some such substitute as elaborate land defences or coast defence ironclads. Such a period was that following the Reform Bill of 1832, until in 1847 an alarm was raised that we were liable to invasion, which, It was stated, had been rendered easy by the introduction of steam. The Duke of Wellington pointed out the defencelessness of the
