to realise now how little prepared we were in 1853 for war with a powerful continental nation, and for such an operation as the invasion of its territory. Though the Naval Department has generally been assumed to have emerged from that war with more credit as regards its organisation than the War Oflfice, the term 'mobilisation,' and its meaning, was entirely unknown in reference to any possible naval operation. If success has come in the past, it has been in spite of our system, not in consequence of it.
For instance, previously to the Crimean War there had been a Transport Department at the Admiralty, but a regard for economy had led to its suppression. Nevertheless, when it was reorganised, energy and ability supplied the want of experience. Its operations were on a large scale, for we conveyed to the east 70,000 officers and men, 5600 horses, and 85,000 tons of stores. To the Baltic, also, we transported 13,000 officers and men, with about 10,000 tons of stores. It must be remembered that our allies looked to us in a great measure for transport. Though steam propulsion was in its infancy, we employed over 100 steam transports, and a slightly greater number of sailing ships. Sir Stafford Northcote, in a letter to Mr Disraeli, dated April 19th, 1862, and printed in his life, says: 'We showed in the Crimean War both our weakness and our strength. Our strength consisted in the elasticity of our resources, the temper of our people, the length of our purse, and the power of our endurance. Our weakness was shown in the confusion of our arrangements and the absence of
