Symposium.
Socrates.
572 Diotima of Mantineia. posium, Socrates, Agathon. The argu- ment was communi- cated to Socrates by Diotima. Love is not to be es- teemed foul and evil be- cause he is not fair and good : I cannot refute you, Socrates, said Agathon : — Let us assume that what you say is true. Say rather, beloved Agathon, that you cannot refute the truth ; for Socrates is easily refuted. And now, taking my leave of you, I will rehearse a talc of love which I heard from Diotima of Mantineia', a woman wise in this and in many other kinds of knowledge, who in the days of old, when the Athenians offered sacrifice before the coming of the plague, delayed the disease ten years. She was my instructress in the art of love, and I shall repeat to you what she said to me, beginning with the admissions made by Agathon, which are nearly if not quite the same which I inade to the wise woman when she questioned me : I think that this will be the easiest way, and I shall take both parts myself as well as I can '. As you, Agathon, suggested •', I must speak first of the being and nature of Love, and then of his works. First I said to her in nearly the same words which he used to me, that Love was a mighty god, and like- wise fair ; and she proved to me as I proved to him that, by my own showing. Love was neither fair nor good. ' What do you mean, Diotima,' I said, 'is love then evil and foul?' 'Hush,' she cried; 'must that be foul which is not fair?' 'Certainly,' I said. 'And is that which is not wise, ignorant? 202 do you not see that there is a mean between wisdom and ignorance?' 'And what may that be?' I said. 'Right opinion,' she replied; 'which, as you know, being incapable of giving a reason, is not knowledge (for how can knowledge be devoid of reason ? nor again, ignorance, for neither can ignorance attain the truth), but is clearly something which is a mean between ignorance and wisdom.' ' Quite true,' I replied. 'Do not then insist,' she said, 'that what is not fair is of necessity foul, or what is not good evil ; or infer that because love is not fair and good he is therefore foul and evil; for he is in a mean between them.' 'Well,' I said, ' Love is surely admitted by all to be a great god.' ' By those who know or by those who do not know?' 'By all.' 'And how, Socrates,' she said with a smile, 'can Love be acknowledged to be a great god by those who say that he is ' Cp. I. Alcibiades. Supra, lyj A. ■^ Cp. Gorgias, 505 E.
