On the other hand, I am compelled to hold, that in questions of first principles they have not really made their own the standpoint and intention of modern metaphysical theory.[1] This suggestion I must illustrate far too briefly. For I shall give greater space, perhaps, than it merits, to a study which only supports this opinion in a secondary degree, and which I pursued in the first instance because of what seemed to me its intrinsic interest, and the kinship of the authors' view with an old tenet of my own. The subject of this study, which follows the present section, is "Logical Priority." If anything in its argument is sound, the authors' doctrine is no doubt in some degree shown to require modification, but is indicated, at the same time, to contain an important element of unrecognised truth.
The centre however, of the six authors' polemic directed, as I understand, against the Idealism of to-day, is concerned with the fundamental position which it is held to assign to Epistemo-
- ↑ I should judge that their philosophical training, which is very likely more thorough than ours, or, say, than mine, e.g., in the detail of Kant, has not directed itself so much to the whole text and context, first of ancient, and secondly of quite recent metaphysic. There is no impropriety, I think, in saying this. It is a very natural difference; and I am absolutely certain, not from their writing alone, that it is the fact. Their training has enabled them to contribute very suggestive novelties to philosophy. That is more than most people have done.
