hand Herát over to Sháh Shujá, the presence of a British contingent might serve at least to keep the rulers of that province true to their English allies. To this scheme also the Governor-General would not agree, in the face of an empty treasury and of warnings received from Leadenhall Street. Towards the close of 1840 the Directors requested Lord Auckland 'seriously to consider which of the two alternatives — a speedy retreat from Afghanistan or a considerable increase of the military force in that country' — he might feel it his duty to adopt. 'We are convinced' — they wrote — 'that you have no middle course to pursue with safety and with honour.'
The Court for their part would prefer 'the entire abandonment of the country, and a frank confession of complete failure,' to the folly of attempting with a small force, or by the mere influence of British Residents, to maintain peace within the Sháh's dominions and prevent aggression from without. Another letter, written after receiving the news of Dost Muhammad's surrender, affirmed the Court's adherence to their previous views. The question came before Lord Auckland's Council in March, 1841. In spite of an increased outlay of three millions and a half, in spite of the known antagonism of his Commander-in-Chief, the Governor-General, backed by Messrs. Bird and Prinsep, decided in effect to go on as he had begun. A loan was opened in Calcutta, and Macnaghten was entreated to keep down the expenditure in Afghánistán. 'How will it end?' wrote
