Page:The Economic Journal Volume 1.djvu/527

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THE REGULATION OF RAILWAY RATES
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such rates, stating 'what part of the whole is allowed to the carrier for inland transportation to the point of export by sea.' This part was sometimes 10 cents or more per 100 lbs. less than the published tariff rates charged to New York. The Produce Exchange of that city complained that there was an unfair discrimination of consignors to that city; and the. companies were ordered by the Court to make no difference between the inland proportion of the through rate and the rate for seaboard consignments. What must probably be the effect of such an order? The total transport charges for consigning grain to Europe depend, not solely on circumstances in the United States, but also on the demand and supply here. The portion of the whole rate allotted for transport to the seaboard may be nominally fixed. What portion will really go to the steam-ship companies and what to the railways the Interstate Commission cannot determine. At most the order can operate only somewhat to the benefit of persons handling grain in New York. From English practice another illustration may be taken. The establishment of 'group rates,' that is uniform rates for all traffic within a certain district, is obviously convenient. The practice exists; at one time it promised to spread more than it has; and it was possible that there would be formed naturally zones or regions within which rates were uniform, to the great convenience of all concerned. Such a tendency was checked by the courts, certain decisions appearing to make many group rates a contravention of Section 2 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854. Nor are matters much improved by the new legislation. Section 29 (1) of the Act of 1888, while professing to legalise group rates, adds the embarrassing proviso,

'Provided that the distances shall not be unreasonable, and that the group rates shall not be such as to create an undue preference.'

Unless meaningless, this is mischievous; under this provision the law of undue preference may be a law of protection to certain traders. Under it 'geographical advantages' may be preserved; for the public the best state of things would be uniform low rates irrespective of distance; a tariff similar in principle to the postal charges. That being unattainable, the next best course is the free formation of group rates or zone tariffs--a policy hitherto impeded by the action of courts of law.