Others could hesitate to take on Article 5 guarantees for a country with such an exposed geographical position as that of Finland: this argument is sometimes heard in the case of a possible Finnish Alleingang. However, the reality within the Alliance is one of a low degree of apprehension vis-à-vis potential membership by Finland and Sweden: acceptability of membership is high, even if views are not as clearly set on its desirability. As indicated in our meetings, however, a Swedish Alleingang, despite its operational advantages, is seen as problematic politically and strategically, as it would isolate Finland. In the case of Finland, the combination of military seriousness along with a proven track record of managing its “Russian agenda” is an asset even if each of its components can draw reservations of the sort indicated a few lines earlier.
Both countries are seen as fully-fledged Western powers with an proven track record as members of the EU and partners of NATO. Within the Alliance, they would be less contentious than the post-Cold War eastward expansion of NATO.
Under the prevailing political and strategic circumstances, we foresee a low probability of NATO deciding to close the door on further enlargement, but it has to be mentioned if only because of its potentially severe consequences for Finland (and Sweden). Furthermore, something of the sort has happened to the EU’s own enlargement process, which has slowed down dramatically in recent years, with no clear prospect of early enlargement to the candidate states of the Western Balkans. If a door-closing (Torschluss) policy took place in NATO, Finland would no longer be able to use the possibility –as well as the reality – of NATO membership as a tool to master the inescapable geopolitical dilemma posed by its unpredictable neighbour. Finland’s range of available policy options would be reduced. There is no push in NATO today for a Torschluss but this could change over time if America’s commitments in Asia were to lead the US to decrease its engagement in Europe.
As a flank country, Finland can also draw some lessons from the experience of Turkey, which had a long common border with the Soviet Union (Georgian, Armenian, Azerbaijan SSRs) and was admitted into NATO in 1952 during the Korean War – namely in a very tense international situation – and which covered about the same expanse of territory as Finland and Sweden, around 800,000 square km. However, there are several differences between the two cases. Given Russia’s historical claims on control of the Turkish Straits, there was a strong consensus in Turkey about the
