Endnotes
1 For another turn to authoritative assumptions and governing ideas to explain the conduct of a great-power rival, see George Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.
2 Commission on Unalienable Rights, Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights, U.S. Department of State, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights/.
3 Daniel J. Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-xi-jinpings-new-era-should-have-ended-us-debate-beijings-ambitions.
4 On constructive engagement with China and later efforts to encourage China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” see “Clinton Defends ‘Constructive Engagement’ of China,” CNN, October 24, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/; President William J. Clinton, “Expanding Trade, Projecting Values: Why I’ll Fight to Make China’s Trade Status Permanent,” The New Democrat, January 1, 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20060215200454/http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=108&subid=127&contentid=965; Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm; President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, White House, March 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/; and President Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, White House, May 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. For a thoughtful critique of this persuasion, see James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China (New York, NY: Penguin, 2008), esp. pp. 69-88 and 101-112.
5 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents. For a critical view, see Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers.
6 Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2020, pp. 4-6, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/china-model-beijings-promotion-alternative-global-norms-and-standards.
7 See, for example, Paul Heer, “Understanding the Challenge from China,” Asan Forum, April 3, 2018, http://www.theasanforum.org/understanding-the-challenge-from-china/; Michael D. Swaine, “The U.S. Can’t Afford to Demonize China,” Foreign Policy, June 29, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/29/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-demonize-china/; M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel, “China is Not an Enemy,” opinion, Washington Post, July 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html; and Fareed Zakaria, “The New China Scare,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 1 (January/February 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare.
8 Robert D. Blackwill, Trump’s Foreign Policies are Better than They Seem, Council Special Report No. 84, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019, https://www.cfr.org/report/trumps-foreign-policies-are-better-they-seem.
9 See, for example, James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China; Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2012); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New
