and “Briefing on Disinformation and Propaganda Related to COVID-19,” press release, March 27, 2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-on-disinformation-and-propaganda-related-to-covid-19/. See also Jakub Janda, “Going Viral: Chinese and Russian Disinfo Ops Compared and Contrasted,” Center for European Policy Analysis, March 19, 2020, https://www.cepa.org/going-viral; and Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” The New York Times, April 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html.
80 As CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping said in Moscow in June 2019: “Russia is the country I have visited the most times, and President Putin is my best friend and colleague.” Quoted in Holly Ellyat, “China’s Xi calls Putin his ‘best friend’ against a backdrop of souring US relations,” CNBC, June 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/putin-and-xi-meet-to-strengthen-ties-as-us-relations-sour.html. Russian president Vladimir Putin similarly praised the “unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation” between the two nations: “This is an alliance relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.” See Vladimir Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club session,” Website of the President of Russia, October 3, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719. See also Vasily Kashin, “Russia and China Take Military Partnership to New Level,” Moscow Times, October 23, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/23/russia-and-china-take-military-partnership-to-new-level-a67852; and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Russia-China Strategic Alliance Gets a New Boost with Missile Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-china-strategic-alliance-gets-a-new-boost-with-missile-early-warning-system/.
81 The PRC and Russia also are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral grouping whose members now also include India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. As one NGO expert notes, SCO’s members “account for 80% of Eurasia’s landmass, 43% of the world’s population, and a quarter of global GDP. In terms of geographic coverage and population size, it is the largest regional organization in the world.” Beijing and Moscow have also sought to provide an alternative to Western-led international order through the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), though with very limited success. See Angela Stent, “Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists,” Brookings Institution, February 2020, p. 6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_russia_china_stent.pdf.
82 “U.S. Dollar’s Share Collapses in Payments for Russia-China Exports,” Moscow Times, July 26, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/26/us-dollars-share-collapses-in-payments-for-russia-china-exports-a66587.
83 “China-Russia Trade Up 3.4% in 2019 Exceeding Record $110Bln — Chinese Customs,” Sputnik, January 14, 2020, https://sputniknews.com/world/202001141078029670-china-russia-trade-up-34-in-2019-exceeding-record-110bln--chinese-customs/.
84 Muyu Xu and Chen Aizhu, “China Oil Imports from Top Supplier Saudi Arabia Rise 47% in 2019: Customs,” Reuters, January 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-oil/china-oil-imports-from-top-supplier-saudi-arabia-rise-47-in-2019-customs-idUSKBN1ZU0EH.
85 Olga Tanas, Anna Shiryaevskaya, and Dan Murtaugh, “How Russia-China Gas Pipeline Changes Energy Calculus,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-25/how-russia-china-gas-pipeline-changes-energy-calculus-quicktake; and Ariel Cohen, “The Strategic Upside Behind Russia’s $55 Billion ‘Power Of Siberia’ Pipeline To China,” Fortune, December 9, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/12/06/is-there-strength-behind-russia-and-chinas-new-power-of-siberia-pipeline/#58f405cb1faf.
86 Swee Lean Collin Koh, “China’s strategic interest in the Arctic goes beyond economics,” opinion,
