Index.
485
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The landed interest will be well represented, | 153 | ||
Not practicable for every class to be represented by its own members, | 154 | ||
Men of extensive information will best represent all classes, | 154 | ||
Persons of strong minds in each class will necessarily rise to distinction, | 155 | ||
Difficulties attending internal taxation by congress discussed, | 156 | ||
Such taxes are usually digested by an individual or a limited board, | 156 | ||
Land taxes will be assessed by persons chosen for the purpose, | 157 | ||
The system of taxation of each state may be used in the state, | 157 | ||
The abuse of the power of taxation is cautiously guarded against, | 157, 158 | ||
If found inconvenient to exercise this power requisitions may be resorted to, | 158 | ||
Reasons for not omitting the power from the constitution, | 158 | ||
Possibility of interference of state and national authority discussed, | 158 | ||
Double sets of revenue officers not often to be apprehended, | 158 | ||
Danger of a system of federal influence discussed, | 159 | ||
Danger of double taxation discussed, | 159 | ||
Poll taxes not to be laid except in great emergencies, but the power to lay them necessary to provide for such occasions, | 160 | ||
XXXVII.—Concerning the difficulties which the convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper plan, | 161 | ||
Difficulty of investigating public measures with candor, | 161 | ||
Allowance to be made for the novelty of the undertaking, | 162 | ||
Difficulty of combining stability and energy with a due regard to liberty, | 162 | ||
Difficulty of marking the line of authority between the general and state governments, | 163 | ||
Similar difficulties constantly experienced in defining the limits of different jurisdictions, | 164 | ||
Difficulty enhanced by conflicting pretensions of larger and smaller states, | 165 | ||
And also by various combinations of interests, | 165 | ||
It is not wonderful if the constitution is defective, but rather that it is not more so, | 166 | ||
Difficulty of reforming a constitution illustrated by the history of the Netherlands, | 166 | ||
XXXVIII.—The subject continued, and the incoherence of the objections to the plan exposed, | 167 | ||
Constitutions have usually been framed by individuals rather than by assemblies, | 167 | ||
Examples from the history of Greece, | 167 | ||
History of the articles of confederation, | 168 | ||
Objections to their adoption failed to point out their real defect, | 168 | ||
In a critical disease, where physicians are unanimous as to the remedy, it is folly to regard the objections of persons unacquainted with the disorder, | 169 | ||
Inconsistency of the objections made to the constitution by different individuals, | 169, 170 | ||
Improbability that the objectors themselves could agree upon any other plan of government, | 171 | ||
However defective the new constitution, it is less so than that which preceded, | 171 | ||
Powers dangerous to liberty now exercised by congress without authority, | 172, 173 | ||
XXXIX, XL.—The conformity of the plan to republican principles: an objection in respect to the powers of the convention, examined, | 174 | ||
The plan of government, if not strictly republican, must be abandoned, | 174 | ||
The question, what constitutes a republic, discussed, | 174 | ||
A republic defined to be a government deriving its power from the people, | 174 |