Page:The Federalist, on the new Constitution.djvu/491

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Index.
485


The landed interest will be well represented, 153
Not practicable for every class to be represented by its own members, 154
Men of extensive information will best represent all classes, 154
Persons of strong minds in each class will necessarily rise to distinction, 155
Difficulties attending internal taxation by congress discussed, 156
Such taxes are usually digested by an individual or a limited board, 156
Land taxes will be assessed by persons chosen for the purpose, 157
The system of taxation of each state may be used in the state, 157
The abuse of the power of taxation is cautiously guarded against, 157, 158
If found inconvenient to exercise this power requisitions may be resorted to, 158
Reasons for not omitting the power from the constitution, 158
Possibility of interference of state and national authority discussed, 158
Double sets of revenue officers not often to be apprehended, 158
Danger of a system of federal influence discussed, 159
Danger of double taxation discussed, 159
Poll taxes not to be laid except in great emergencies, but the power to lay them necessary to provide for such occasions, 160
XXXVII.—Concerning the difficulties which the convention must have experienced in the formation of a proper plan, 161
Difficulty of investigating public measures with candor, 161
Allowance to be made for the novelty of the undertaking, 162
Difficulty of combining stability and energy with a due regard to liberty, 162
Difficulty of marking the line of authority between the general and state governments, 163
Similar difficulties constantly experienced in defining the limits of different jurisdictions, 164
Difficulty enhanced by conflicting pretensions of larger and smaller states, 165
And also by various combinations of interests, 165
It is not wonderful if the constitution is defective, but rather that it is not more so, 166
Difficulty of reforming a constitution illustrated by the history of the Netherlands, 166
XXXVIII.—The subject continued, and the incoherence of the objections to the plan exposed, 167
Constitutions have usually been framed by individuals rather than by assemblies, 167
Examples from the history of Greece, 167
History of the articles of confederation, 168
Objections to their adoption failed to point out their real defect, 168
In a critical disease, where physicians are unanimous as to the remedy, it is folly to regard the objections of persons unacquainted with the disorder, 169
Inconsistency of the objections made to the constitution by different individuals, 169, 170
Improbability that the objectors themselves could agree upon any other plan of government, 171
However defective the new constitution, it is less so than that which preceded, 171
Powers dangerous to liberty now exercised by congress without authority, 172, 173
XXXIX, XL.—The conformity of the plan to republican principles: an objection in respect to the powers of the convention, examined, 174
The plan of government, if not strictly republican, must be abandoned, 174
The question, what constitutes a republic, discussed, 174
A republic defined to be a government deriving its power from the people, 174