176
��GOOD LUCK
��Each one wrote the opinions in the cases assigned to him, and to use the pointed language of Judge Perley, "took the responsibility of it." The judges who in form decided these two cases, never looked far enough to see that they had made two antagonistic and irreconcilable decisions; and Good- ing v. Riley has a history of its own.
In Chesterfield v. Hart, 350, it was held that an infant of sufficient proper- ty, was liable under the pauper statutes for the support of her grandmother.
In Porter v. Tarlton, 372, it was held that a sheriff who delivered attached goods to a receiptor, did so at his own risk, unless the taking of the receipt was directed or ratified by the creditor. This was undoubtedly the ancient law in this state. It has also been so held in other jurisdictions. The modern doctrine in this state that a sheriff was bound to accept a receiptor was the re- sult of judicial legislation. Whether it was rational or not, is one thing; whether it was the law or not, another. It is obvious that a receipt is a con- tract. Like other contracts it should receive a rational interpretation. To meet the supposed equities of particu- lar cases, the courts have warped such contracts, and adopted abortive views of them, and in order to support refine- ments without reason, and distinctions without sense, they have been com- pelled to invent a history which they
��ought to have known never existed. JS T ot a few of these contradictory de- cisions, owe their existence to the fact that the judges were not aware of the decisions which had been previously made upon the same point. As illus- trations, Phelps v. Gilchrist, 28 N. H., 266; and Sanborn v. Buswell, 51 N. H., 573, are in point as respects Rem- ick v. Atkinson, n N. H., 256. In their attempts to reach justice, our court, in the matter of receipts, and the su- preme court of the United States, in the bond and tax cases, have created an anomalous class of contracts and made a deformity of the law so that it now de- pends upon arbitrary precedents in- stead of legal principles.
In Bryant v. Ela, 396, the court held in effect, that where no personal service is had upon the defendant, the court had no jurisdiction over him for any other purpose than as affects the prop- erty attached; that such suits were pro- ceedings in rem; that they were re- stricted in their scope to the property attached • and that the attachment was the necessary foundation for any fur- ther proceedings. This decision re- ceives strong support from a recent de- cision of the supreme court of the United States, that in those states where a sale is allowed instead of an attach- ment, no jurisdiction can be acquired without personal service.'
��GO OB LUC A'.
��FROM THE GERMAN OF GEIBEL.
Good luck is only a flighty thing. And has been from the beginning; Yon may limit for her all the world round And yet the creature may not be found.
Throw yourself on the dewy grass. Am! sing your songs to the tickle lass; Quickly, perhaps, from out the blue skies, She may descend to sooth your sighs.
Then you must seize and hold her close, But do not make your complaints verbose : Though she so long has kept you waiting, Mayhap a new flight she is meditating.
��-Lucia Moses.
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