Page:The Great Didactic of John Amos Comenius (1896).pdf/46

This page has been proofread, but needs to be validated.
32
THE GREAT DIDACTIC OF COMENIUS

The Janua Rerum was in the first instance to give a synopsis of natural phenomena in the same way that the Janua Linguarum did of the Latin language, but its construction was to be quite different from that of the Encyclopædias in use. “Even the best-arranged Encyclopædias that I have so far seen have been more like a chain containing many links well fastened together than like an automaton whose wheels are cunningly contrived so that the whole can set itself in motion.”[1] This defect can be obviated by disposing the arts and sciences in such a manner that we may begin with what we know best and proceed by slow degrees to what is less familiar. In this way the first chapter will throw light on the second, the second on the third, and so on.[2] The essential point is that the universal laws of thought be taken as a basis, and that then, by sound processes of reasoning, some universal way be opened to ascertaining the truth of things.[3] It is by neglecting to find this universal principle and by limiting themselves to one subject that physicists and philosophers in general have fallen into so many errors and contradictions. The hypotheses of Copernicus are plausible, it is true, but quite inconsistent with the laws of physics. Gilbert, totally absorbed in the study of magnetism, has tried to base his whole philosophy upon it, and here again has offended against the true principles of nature.[4] Campanella’s views met with some approval, but were overthrown by the telescope of Galileo Galilei. These contradictions cannot be avoided “unless the rays of truth that are scattered through all things meet together in one spot, so that the same symmetry may be evident in all that appertains to the senses, to the intellect, and to divine

  1. Delineatio, sec. 39.
  2. Ibid. sec. 24.
  3. Ibid. sec. 26. Ut per universalissima cognoscendi principia, eosque ad ultimas usque conclusiones rite deducendi modos, universalem aliquam veritati rerum cognoscendæ aperiret viam.
  4. Ibid. Gilbertus magnetis speculatione abreptus totam Philosophiam ex magnete deducere voluit: sed evidentissime cum injuria principiorum Physicorum.