There was, however, a considerable num ber of the profession, men perhaps who had been trained in law schools elsewhere, who strove to improve this condition of things. They had been, however, thwarted in a variety of ways. The tradition still lingered that a lawyer merely held an office, instead of being a member of a learned pro fession. All the early lawyers had been ad mitted to practice by the mere mandate of the governor, without any examination as to professional ability or training. More than a hundred of these appointments still exist in the records of the State, in the Sec retary of State's office at Albany, running through a period of seventy years just pre ceding the American Revolution. They are simply letters patent, appointing a specified person an attorney at law, with authority to appear and practise " in all his Majesty's courts of record," or perhaps only in some specified court. Though this method dis appeared at the organization of the State, the idea lying at the root of it prevailed long after the State government was formed. The mass of the public regarded the pro fession of the law as a legalized monopoly. Politicians determined to sweep this last feature out of existence; and accordingly in the State Constitution of 1846, a clause was inserted (Article Six, Section 8), that "any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who pos sesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practise in all the courts of the State." This clause required no special mode of training, no attendance in a law office, no period of time devoted to study. Any per son, no matter how ignorant of law or litera ture, could present himself for examination as to his moral character and as to his learning and ability. The examination was held by sporadic committees, appointed by any one of eight sections or divisions of the Supreme Court, each composed of a distinct set of judges, administering, as was said by a highly distinguished lawyer, " octagonal law." If
the examination was satisfactory to the com mittee, which was a law unto itself, the candidate was admitted to practise as an at torney and counsellor at law in all the courts of the State. The questions asked were for the most part trivial. Little knowledge of the great principles of law was called for or exhibited. Sometimes the examination re sembled a screaming farce, as when some pretentious negro, having a full vocabulary of words at command, but with the most scanty knowledge of their meaning, submit ted himself to the scrutiny, or more accu rately to the mercy, of the examiners. If the candidate were rejected summarily, he had only to wait for a time, perhaps change his residence to another judicial division where the examination was understood to be even more lax, and try the temper of a dif ferent set of examiners. He might thus go the round of the districts and commence anew. No regulation required, after his re jection, any additional period of study. Mat ters were not much better before the new Constitution. As the writer of this article came to the bar in 1845, he is able to state from personal experience that admission could be had even under the old regime from a committee of leading lawyers by a successful answer to a single and narrow inquiry. This was on what morning of a particular week in the term of the Supreme Court a specified motion should be made, the day being fixed by a rule of court. If .this was the outcome of a bar examination under a court of three judges, headed by Judge Nelson, afterwards of the Supreme Court of the United States, it may be. con ceived what it must have been under the eight-branched court of the Constitution of 1846, and its ever-changing committees of examiners. This system, or rather no system, prevailed when the Columbia Law School commenced its existence (Nov. 1, 1858). There had previously been some lectures delivered, under the auspices of the College, by the distinguished Chancellor James Kent, to
