touching as it does so many and such varied topics, and not infrequently suggesting questions which the courts have not reached, but in the direction of which the current of legal controversy is setting it self. But little conception can be had, without actual experience of the matter, of the vast labor involved in sifting from the innumerable decisions such points as may be of value. In a case deciding a point in the law of Evidence, dicta may be found upon other points in other branches of the law. A well-written opinion, in throwing light upon the points in con troversy, becomes oftentimes a mine of legal wealth upon points widely separated from that immediately under consideration. These indications of judicial leaning should have their place. The task of assort ment is not an easy one. A sense of proportion, judgment, and analytical power are all requisite. It is no slight matter to represent that the court in Roe v. Doe, says that x=y. when, as a matter of verity, neither of these factors enters into the problem, and even if they had entered into it the result would not have been as stated. The work of classification and arrangement next follows. Upon the wisdom of classification will de pend the facility with which the digest may be serviceably handled. Its nature will depend upon the angle of vision of the classifier; but his will be the most serviceable who places himself for the time in the attitude of the consulfer, and succeeds in appre hending upon what channels of legal nomenclature he will be likely to embark, in order to reach as near as may be the desired haven. It will appear from this examination that a digest is to be approached not as a labor-saving machine primarily, but rather as a suggester of new lines of investigation, with the occasional result of throwing sufficient light upon the mooted point, to indicate clearly the path of fu ture adjudication. With the gradual steady increase in the volume of decisions, the task of keeping abreast of the law is increasingly difficult. Without the aid of the digester the condition of both bench and bar, so far as its ability to cope with this difficulty is con cerned, would become less and less favorable; but the digest, it should be remembered, is the reposi tory of the law hitherto enacted and interpreted, and not an oracle speaking in future with a reply looking to the solution of every conceivable legal puzzle. Just in proportion as the practice of the law is al lowed to tend in the direction of becoming a trade, the dangers of compendiums for the cure of all legal disputes will increase. It is one of the privileges of the digester to disclaim any such intention, and of the practitioner to understand the nature of the aid which he invokes. They may thus work together for a com mon end, — the mastery of the constantly increasing adjudications upon the many and varied branches of the law, which are best handled by systematic analy
sis and classification, keeping distinct the proper lines of demarcation, and endeavoring, as near as may be, to reduce the principles in force at a given period to a science. The problem grows increasingly difficult with each new question calling for judicial settlement. From a force lending such substantial aid in its so lution, neither judges nor lawyers can afford to withhold proper recognition; and in proportion as practitioner and digester understand each the labor of the other, will the work of both be facilitated. E. W. Fitzgerald.
LEGAL ANTIQUITIES. The following were the salaries of the law officers of the Crown in the year 1616 : — £ s. d. Attorney-General . . . . 8i 6 8 Solicitor-General .... 70 o o King's Serjeant .... 41 610 King's Advocate 20 o o The salaries of the judges show that they must have depended a good deal on fees : — Sir E. Coke, Lord Chief Jus- £ tice of England .... 224 Circuits 33 "258 Puisne Judges of King's Bench and Common Pleas ... 188 Besides Circuits 33 221 Chief Justice of Common Pleas . 194 Chief-Baron .188 Puisne Barons ... . 133 Judge on Norfolk Circuit . . 12
s. d. 19 9 6 8 6 s 6 6 13
8 8 4
19 6 6 6
9 o 8 8
The usual amount of honoraries to counsel in this reign I have not been able to ascertain. From an entry in the parish books of St. Margaret's, Westminster, it appears that in the reign of Edward IV., they paid " Roger Fylpott, learned in the law, for his counsel, 3*. 81/., with 4</. for his dinner."— Campbell's Lives of the Chancellors. By an Act of 52 Geo. III., transportation for a term of fourteen years was substituted for a pecuni ary penalty for making false entries in parish registerbooks; but the clause directing the division of the
