must have a foundation of hard facts, verified by sane reason, for any appeal to their emotions. It will not do for the orator merely to persuade his hearers that he be lieves that such and such facts exist, and then, by impassioned rhetoric, endeavor to inoculate them with his own enthusiasm. He must induce them by essentially scien tific methods to share his belief, and it is then comparatively easy to awaken the enthusiasm. The facts, if they be meretorious, will them selves in a great measure generate the enthusiasm, and the flame will require but little fanning. Tact and good taste may, unaided, accomplish great results, though a little passion at the close, when a legiti mate foundation has been laid, is of course effective. Matthew Arnold has said that religion is morality touched by emotion. This epigram gives a clew to a definition of eloquence from our modern point of view. We should say that eloquence is that faculty of discourse which produces in the hearer conviction touched by emotion. There must first be implanted conviction of the inherent merits, and then righteous indignation, sympa thetic compassion, or some other feeling should be evoked, to transform mere con viction into an active force, prolific of prac tical results. It follows that whoever would persuade and influence audiences or juries of the present day must study first of all the most effective method of presenting facts. Although histrionic poses and tricks have, with the decline of the old style of speaking, largely fallen into disuse, nothing is of greater service than a genuine dramatic sense. It enables the speaker to place him self in imagination in the mental attitude of other men, and determine what considerations of fact will most probably work in his favor,
and which of the circumstances had best be suppressed. The speeches of Erskine have been gen erally accepted by the present generation as a model of forensic eloquence. No man ever had to a greater degree than he the faculty of making facts speak. In his addresses to juries as well as to courts, there was selfeffacement and the constant effort so to present the subject that his audience might see it in its true light for themselves, and not be put off with the speaker's descrip tions or opinions. It seems only natural that one so essentially modern in his methods should also be free from florid rhetoric and turgid imagery. Those persons who claim that we have no genuine oratory at the bar to-day would be obliged to exclude Erskine from the list of orators. Of course, there is always the danger of going to extremes in the consideration of any theme. What are sometimes termed the old-fashioned graces of oratory are not to be entirely overlooked. Good rhetoric, graceful action, and a pleasing voice are powerful adjuncts to argumentative force. The theatrical element does to an extent enter into most jury trials, the parties on one side or the other endeavoring to play such parts as are not inconsistent with the facts they cannot deny. Mother wit will often prompt the advocate how to counter act one piece of attitudinizing by another. Great sincerity and earnestness in a client's behalf, especially if the counsel have lofty character to back it, will count for much in verdict-getting. But all these considerations are insignificant in comparison with the main one of so introducing the facts into other minds, that conviction and enthusiastic sym pathy are produced according to the inevitable laws of thought. — New York Law Journal.
