Long before he was selected for the head of the court he had secured rightfully the reputation of being one of the best special pleaders at the bar. He always delighted in this intricate part of the practice, and has not yet lost his love for it. It was, in the early days of his professional life, still a substantial part of a lawyer's education, but it has now given way to the demands of improvement, and is rarely used. It may seem strange to those who know the ChiefJustice's dislike for technicalities to learn of his early and continuing love for what seems the most technical part of the practice. But special pleading, in the opinion of such law yers as he, was a science, subject to rule and capable of being reduced to mathematical precision. He lost nothing by his apparent idleness during the first few years after his being licensed. He was not an idle man, he could not be; and his after life has shown that at some period he has been industrious in studies which have stored his mind with treasures of legal lore which could have been gained only by severe and thorough research. About ten years after he came to the bar he began his career of success as an advocate before the three great courts, and from that time until he was made ChiefJustice was always in demand. There were few causes of importance before the courts at Trenton in which he did not appear. His acknowledged .ability, his great experience in the examination and argument of cases be fore the higher tribunals of the State, and his peculiar fitness for the position were so prominent that when Chief-Justice Whelpley died, all eyes were turned to him as a fit suc cessor to that distinguished man; and in less than fifteen days after the death of his pre decessor he was nominated and confirmed. He assumed the position on the 8th of March, 1864; was again nominated and confirmed in 1871; then in 1878, and for the fourth time in 1885, so that he has been in office for twentyseven years, and his selection, each time, has met with the approval of all classes. He first
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sat in the Court of Errors in the March term of 1864, and rendered the first opinion reported of that term. The case was one in which an important question of practice arose : Whether writs of error were the appropriate remedy in certain cases. The cause involved principles which demanded from the deciding judge an examination of the history of writs of error. The Chief-Justice was necessarily obliged in the delivery of his opinion to ex hibit his great learning, which he did in a most masterly manner. Every opinion de livered at that term, which has been reported, was prepared by him. This eaily manifesta tion of industry was a promise of his future action which has been fully performed. The books of reports abundantly show that there has been no more industrious member of the court than he, and that he has done his share of the work of the two tribunals of which he forms so important a part and is so conspicuous a member. The circuits over which the Chief-Justice has presided have not been the most import ant in the State; but some weighty causes, both civil and criminal, have been tried be fore him. But his true place is not in these tribunals. There is not the same opportunity there for him to exhibit his real capabilities as in courts where argument and logic are more predominant, and where he can listen to debates between the master minds of the bar. In the dignified quiet and repose of these higher tribunals he can calmly hear, and with leisure for reflection and time for thought decide, the important issues sub mitted to him. His written opinions are strong and vigorous, learned and pointed, and display a firm grasp of all legal subjects in volved; but they are sometimes somewhat obscure, and need close observation and the strictest attention to grasp fully the meaning. There is a marked difference between the Chief-Justice's written decisions and his charges to juries; his opinions abound with uncommon words, not unfrcquently coined from his own fertile brain, while his charges to juries are models of directness and sim
