me to mine own — I covet not thine — nei ther lathe nor land — nor sac nor soc — nor covet thou mine — nought need I from thee — nought did I mean unto thee." The old form of marriage, yet retained in the Episco pal service, is clearly rhythmical in its struc ture : "To have and to hold, from this
day forward, for better for worse, for richer for poorer, to love and to cherish, till death us do part." We might go on citing similar instances, but we have said enough, we think, to de monstrate the close connection between law and poetry.
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY. WHILE neither " useless " nor, perhaps, "entertaining," the opinion of Mr. Justice O'Brien, of the Supreme Court of New York, in the case of Schuyler vs. Custis et als., is so edifying to the profession, and covers a subject of such vital importance to every private citizen, that we are induced to give it in full to our readers. The opinion is as follows : — "This is a motion for the continuance of a pre liminary injunction restraining the defendants from proceeding with a project for making and ex hibiting a statue of the late Mrs. George Schuy ler, who before her marriage was a Miss Mary M. Hamilton. "Mrs. Schuyler had no children; but the plain tiff, who is a nephew and stepson, brings this action on behalf of himself and all her other nearest living relatives. "The defendants, except Hartley, who is the sculptor engaged to execute the statue, are mem bers of the Woman's Memorial Fund Association, which has undertaken to raise money by public subscription for a life size statue of Mrs. Schuyler, to be designated as ' The Typical Philanthropist,' and lias publicly announced its intention of placing this statue on public exhibition at the Columbian Exposition to be held in Chicago in 1893, as a companion piece to a bust of the well-known agitator, Susan B. Anthony, which bust is to be designated as • The Typical Reformer.' "Neither Mrs. Schuyler in her lifetime, nor her husband after her death, knew or consented to the project; and in view of the attitude assumed by plaintiff on behalf of her nearest living relatives, it must he concluded that so far as the family is concerned, the project is unauthorized.
"The defendants, however, contend that, irre spective of the wishes of the family, they have the right to commemorate her life and worth by a suit able monument, and to that end to receive subscrip tions from such of the public as are disposed to give. "They therefore contend that this action is not maintainable at all; and if it were, its maintenance is against public policy. "As to the first point, it is urged that an injunc tion can only be granted in a case where damages could be recovered in an action at law. "This objection to the granting of an injunction was raised in Pollard vs. Photographic Co. (40 Ch. D. 345 ), and thus disposed of : — "' But the counsel for the defendant did not hesitate to contend boldly that no injunction could be granted in a case where there could be no in jury to property in respect to which damages could be recovered in an action at law. . . . "' The right to grant an injunction does not de pend in any way on the existence of property, as alleged; nor is it worth while to consider carefully the grounds upon which the old Court of Chan cery used to interfere by injunction. But it is quite clear that, independently of any question as to the right at law, the Court of Chancery always had an original and independent jurisdiction to prevent what that court considered and treated as a wrong, whether arising from a violation of an unquestionable right or from breach of confidence or contract, as pointed out by Lord Cottenham in Prince Albert vs. Strange (1 McN. & G., 25).' "The claim that the maintenance of the action is against public policy is based upon the argument that a recognition of such a right in relatives might prevent the public from erecting statues to Wash ington, to Lincoln, or to any other great or dis tinguished man or woman.
