Guilds mid Guild-Laws. clusions as to the existence and nature of unions in the pre-Normanic period. The laws referred to are Articles 16, 17, 20, and 21 of the " Laws of Ina" (a. d. 688726); also Articles 27 and 28 of the " Laws of Aelfred " (a. d. 871-901), and the jFudicia civitatis Lundoniae of the reign of Aethelstan (a. d. 924-940). For details the reader is referred to the literature mentioned in the note, the limits of an article permitting only a resume- and conclusions.1 These laws enact in substance that when a person is killed, the weregrld was to be paid by — or to, as the case might be — the relations (maegas, magen) and the gegyldan. From these laws it appears that a man had connections of some kind; if he did not have any relations, he at least had associates {gegyldan)? These ge gyldan were responsible for his acts, and also entitled to compensation for his loss by murder. From the early guild-statutes appear some noteworthy features of the ancient guilds. They had common meals, and were bound to secure the spiritual welfare of members by the performance of religious acts; and it appears also that guilds existed for the purpose of preserving the peace in the "hundreds." The nature of these ancient guilds was a mixed one. Thus, a guild of Exeter, known to us through the statutes of the eleventh century, partook very much of the nature of a modern lodge. There were regular con tributions to a common fund, from which aid was rendered for funerals and loss by fire. It appears that these guilds were strong centralized unions, often wielding enormous powers. They were formed with the cere mony of an oath; they protected their mem bers, as well as represented them against all attacks. They were responsible for the pay ment of the weregild, and also entitled to it 1 Schmidt, Gesetze der Angelsachscn; Thorpe, An cient Laws and Institutes of England. 2 Bosworth, Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, ed. Toller, fed. 363-
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when a member was killed by a non-member. In case of refusal they threatened revenge. They demanded the aid of the magistrates, of the sheriff, and punished them in case of failure to render their assistance. Unions of this kind are possible only in anomalous states of society, — either when the society or the State is in its first forma tion, or when it is approaching its end. The Anglo-Saxon kingdom was rapidly approach ing its dissolution; and we can form a pic ture of the state of affairs .at that time from the necessity men were under to form guilds for their protection. The modern legislator might profit by a comparison of modern unions with the Anglo-Saxon guilds. The experience of mankind has generally run in uniform channels, similar conditions pro ducing similar results; and it is not too much to say that modern unions for pur poses of protection, private redress, and in dividual — and often irresponsible and illegal — initiative in the enforcement of their rights evidence an unhealthy state of soci ety, and a more than unsatisfactory condi tion of laws. Neither is comparison carried too far if we class vigilance-committees, trades-unions with their incidents of " boy cotting," in the same category with the ancient guilds that enforced the law for themselves. A society recently formed in England for the purposes of protecting wit nesses from insult is an instance of an organization for the repression of real or fancied wrongs. Whatever may be said on this subject, the symptom is that of an un healthy legal administration; and it shows that the people intend by organized extra legal action to influence the existing state of judicial procedure. Without claiming that such organizations and the ancient guilds are identical, the attention of the historian, jurist, and economist ought to be directed more than it is to the historical study of guilds and similar associations; for the influence they have had on the devel opment of the law must not be underrated. Law is a phenomenon of society, and has its
