to be, something which helps the jury to a conclusion as to where the truth lies. The West Virginian is terribly afraid of "perjury," and talks about the in crease of it. In our humble opinion this is all theo retical nonsense. But grant it, and still the ancient declaration of the law that no party should have the privilege of telling his own story under oath for fear of perjury was unjust in the extreme. The law might as well say that a man of notoriously bad character, or one whose reputation for truth and veracity had once been impeached, should not be admitted to testify in a suit between others, because his testi mony would probably not help to the elucidation of the truth. Our West Virginia friends need to rid themselves of all this old Calvinistic cant about the danger and the increase of perjury. We have no doubt that the change in the rule is extremely bene ficial everywhere, but if it were not, and if it did leave the case where it would have been under the old rule, it is only the simplest justice to admit the parties. If we should allow, for illustration, that the common asseverations of each lawyer in every cause - that he believes that his client is right and that his witnesses have told the truth, and that all the other side have lied, do not help elucidate the truth, still it would be absurd enough to prohibit attorneys from doing that thing. •
NOTES OF CASES. Innkeeper's Liability. — A novel point was de cided inMcHughv. Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 480, 23 L. R. A. 574, namely, that an innkeeper is liable for the death of a person who while sick is driven out into the storm without adequate covering, and left for about half an hour in a stream of melting ice and snow where he falls from inability to stand on his feet, if it was reasonable to suppose that death might follow such sudden exposure in his condition. The Court said : — "The learned judge was asked to instruct the jury, in substance, that if the deceased was troublesome to the defendants, and annoying to their guests, they might right fully put him out of their house, if they used no unneces sary force or violence. This point was refused as framed, but the learned judge proceeded to state the rule thus : ' If the annoying acts were willful, the defendants could remove decedent in the manner stated in point. If however they were the result of sickness, although they might, under certain circumstances, remove him, such removal must be in a manner suited to his condition.' 'Phis was saying that if McHugh was intoxicated, and the disturbances made by him were due to his intoxication, he might be treated as a drunken man; but if he was sick, and the disturbances caused by him were due to his sickness, he must be treated with the consideration due to a sick man. This is a correct statement of the rule. In the
delirium of a fever a sick man may become very trouble some to a hotel keeper, and his groans and cries may be annoying to the occupants of rooms near him; but this would not justify turning him forcibly from his bed into the street during a winter storm. What the condition of the decedent really was went properly to the jury for determination. If they found the fact to be that he was suffering from sickness, then the learned judge properly said that, if his removal was to be undertaken, it should be conducted in a manner suited to one in his condition. The question which the defendants were bound to consider before putting the decedent out in the storm was not whether such exposure ' would ' surely cause death, but what was it reasonable to suppose might follow such a sudden exposure of the decedent in the condition in which he then was. What were the probable consequences of pushing a sick man, in the condition the decedent was in, out into the storm, without adequate covering, and, when he fell, from inability to stand on his feet, leaving him to lie in the stream of melting ice and snow that ran over the pavement of the alley, for about a half hour in all, in the condition in which Officer White found him?"
Life Insurance — Interest. — In Carpenter v. United States Life Insurance Co., 161 Pa. St. 9, 23 L. R. A. 571, it was held that the assumption of parental relations, although without any legal obli gation, by a man who sends a girl to school and pays her expenses, is sufficient to give her an insurable in terest in his life so as to sustain a policy which he procures and assigns to her. The Court said : — "It does not matter that this interest was without legal obligation on the part of the insured. It was a relation in every other respect parental." In the " cases cited by the appellee," " the holder of the policy was interested in the death rather than in the life of the insured, and the policy was speculative. In the case before us the plaintiffs in terest was wholly in the life of the insured." "There may be an insurable interest not accompanied by kinship. Such interest implies a pecuniary interest, present or prospective. Cooke, Life Ins., sec. 59. A moral obligation is sufficient to support it. Ferguson v. Massa chusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co., 32 Hun, 306. A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, who has been discharged in bankruptcy. Says May on Insurance (sec. 170): ' The relationship seems to be of but little import ance, except as tending to give rise to the circumstances which justify the expectation. Indeed, the doctrine of the latest of the Massachusetts cases before cited is broad enough to cover a case where there is no relationship at all, save one, perhaps, of mere friendship, if the circum stances are such as to show that the loss of the insured life will probably result in pecuniary disadvantage to the person procuring the insurance.' Here the plaintiff had nothing whatever to do with the procurement of the policy, or its assignment; paid no part of the premium, and, so far as appears, never expected to pay any, for she was ignor ant of its existence during the lifetime of the insured. She had substantial grounds for expecting decided pecuni ary advantage from his life. Why, then, should the con
