fruits of this undertaking be preserved for a great number of years; " and so has it been. The great service rendered by Judges William Kennon, John W. Okey and Luther Day in the formulation and revision of the Code is worthy of special mention. The judges, therefore, who were on the bench when the Code system was inau gurated, and those who came on for a few years subsequently, like the early judges when the state was formed, had new and important problems to determine, as it be came their duty to see that the procedure was started right. All was not harmony upon the adoption of the Code. The system seems simple enough now, but the change was bitterly opposed, and the system little understood at first; its staunchest friend was Judge Joseph R. Swan, whose opinions while a judge of the Supreme Court contain able expositions of many of its provisions. There probably never was a man in Ohio who had a clearer conception of the two systems, and the profession are more largely indebted to him for his services as judge and author than to any other man. The pur pose of his work on pleading was to clear the confusion which existed in the minds of the profession, and although not so preten tious as other works, it ranks much higher in many respects. Concluding this branch of the sketch we come to the much mooted question of Relief of the Supreme Court. For many years the crowded condition of the docket has been a grave problem, difficult of solution. For a number of years members of the Bar of Ohio have been discussing the question, and nowhere has it been more thoroughly con sidered than at the meetings of the State Bar Association held annually. But it seemed more difficult for that body to ar rive at a conclusion than it is for a jury to agree upon complicated questions of fact after listening to able arguments of brainy barristers. Some there were who wanted to put up a fence high enough to keep a
certain class of litigants out of the court of last resort. In other words they desired to have a limitation in the amount involved in an action prescribed, so that those whose controversies did not reach the prescribed limit would have been prevented from hav ing one more chance of fighting their battle over and from procuring the opinion of the highest tribunal. Such a provision would often have prevented the determination and final adjudication of grave and important questions on the sole ground of an insuffi ciency of an amount involved. Such a proposition needs but to be stated to be re pudiated by all fair-minded men, and would have been wholly in disregard of the prin ciple enunciated at the opening of the first court, when it was declared that the court was opened for the administration of evenhanded justice to the poor and to the rich, without respect to persons. Another class entertained the opinion that the coiyt should be increased in number, and divided in sections. Consequently in the year 1892 the Legislature was prevailed upon to pass and did pass an act, as an experiment, pro viding for an increase of one judge, requiring the court to divide into two sections of three each. But the law has not at this date been placed in practical operation, because the Legislature failed to provide proper con veniences for holding two courts, and the court continues to work as before. The addition to the court, however, has had the effect of facilitating the work in various ways. If we were to express any view upon the subject of reform, it would be the hope that the court continue working as it now is until the legislature increase the court to ten judges, divided into two divisions of five each. There is nothing to be gained by a division of the present number as designed by the present law, except, possibly, a greater amount of work, and that is not all that must be considered. Each suit has al ready been passed upon by the Circuit Court of three members.
