Imprisonment for Debt. try to an extent that reflects rather severely on its civilization and culture. Statistics show that during the past year no less than six thousand poor insolvents have been con fined in prison for debts unpaid, ranging in amount from three shillings to twenty-five pounds. In America, strange as the fact may ap pear, the practice also throve. The creditors, usually a wealthy and influential class in the community, favored the importation of the law from England. The legislatures of the various states as well as Congress vested the courts with power to employ the proceeding in the enforcement of a money demand. The punishment provided for was slight, but, mild as it was, it was taking liberty when property alone had been contracted for, and soon became obnoxious. The first blow struck at the iniquity was in the halls of Congress. In 1832 a measure was proposed in the Senate abolishing all imprisonment for debt under process of a federal court, and, be it said to the fame and glory of our na tional legislature, the bill was passed. Here the reform began. The debate and discus sion that the measure engendered stimulated the various state legislatures to thought upon the subject. It aroused the people to the evils and injustice of the practice, and im pressed upon all the necessity for a change in the law of the states governing the subject. The masses of men, or the representatives of the masses are not often wilfully or know ingly unjust or despotic, and when the system of incarceration for debt was presented in its true aspect and the science and theory of the law made manifest, its abolition was inevita ble. State after state either wiped the law from the statute book or modified it so ma
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terially that it could work no hardship. And to-day America has virtually thrown off this legal leech, which sucks the blood of the body corporate, and must eventually para lyze the community or nation that permits it to live and flourish. A proposition of this character should be considered theoretically. To argue theory is often to explode a fallacy; to talk practice is apt to sanction error — the theory of im prisonment for debt is this : A having am ple facilities of discovering B's present con dition and future possibilities, advances him, on the faith of these, a sum of money. B by an unfortunate investment loses the money, or otherwise becomes unable to repay the sum borrowed. What is the natural conclu sion? Simply this: A has entered into a transaction with his eyes open, being in no way compelled to lend B money, but, satis fied that B will liquidate the demand, sup plied him with funds. Subsequent events develop the fact that he erred, and, like most errors in the business world, the result has been a pecuniary loss. To most soundminded men this would seem reasonable and just, but the advocates of the principle say, "No, A has suffered a loss at B's hands; it is true through no intentional wrong of B, but yet B is liable to make good the amount." Therefore, as a consideration is a benefit to one or a disadvantage to the other, and as A cannot secure the benefit by reason of B's insolvency, therefore the other alternative of the proposition must be applied and B put under the decided disadvantage of depriva tion of liberty and loss of reputation. We must presume that this is the reason ing urged in behalf of the system, and it needs but be stated to be pronounced falla cious in its every particular.
