Governor Edward Solomon, himself a lawyer of the Milwaukee bar, deemed the cool, exact, methodical cast of Downer's mind to be the beau ideal quality of the judge. Matt. H. Carpenter predicted that he would make a model judge. He entered upon his duties in November, 1864. He was elected by the people, unopposed, in the following April, for the term of six years. After serving nearly three years he volun tarily resigned in September, 1867, finding the labor too confining and less congenial than he had expected. He was regarded as a fair, just judge. His mind clung rather closely to the strictness of the law, and was inclined — at least such was the belief of the bar — to underestimate the equitable aspects of the case in hand. His judicial labors are reported in the icth, 2Oth, and 2 ist Wisconsin Reports. The two opinions most important and long est to be remembered that he gave are worthy of mention here. One was the case of Gillespie v. Palmer (20 Wis. 544), which arose as follows : The Wisconsin Constitu tion, adopted in 1848, conferred the right of suffrage on white citizens, and white per sons who had declared intentions to become citizens, etc. It was provided that " the legislature may at any time extend the right of suffrage to persons not therein enu merated, but no such law shall be in force until the same shall have been submitted to a vote of the people, at a general election, and approved by a majority of all the votes cast at such election." In 1849, a law was passed conferring the right of suffrage on colored persons, otherwise qualified, and this law was submitted to the people at the next general election. A majority of the votes cast on that question were in favor of the law, but many voters did not vote at all upon this measure, though voting for offi cers, and the law did not receive a number of votes sufficient to be a majority of all the votes cast at the election. The State Board of canvassers construed the Consti
tution to mean that a majority of all the voters voting at the election must have voted for the law in order to give it force, and declared that it had been defeated for lack of sufficient votes. This decision was accept ed at the time, and the matter rested for sixteen years, and persons of color were not allowed to vote. But in 1865, when negro suffrage became a burning question, the decision made by the canvassers in 1849 was challenged. Byron Paine, then home from the war, and ever the friend of the oppressed but recently liberated race, made up a case to test the question. Gillespie, a mulatto, otherwise qualified, presented him self at the polling place of one of the wards in- Milwaukee, and demanded that the inspectors receive his ballot. They refused to allow him to vote, solely on the ground that he was a colored man. He brought an action on the case against the inspectors of election, the facts being set forth in the complaint so as to raise the whole question on demurrer. From the order sustaining the demurrer, the case came on appeal to the Supreme Court. Judge Downer de livered the opinion deciding that the proper construction of the constitutional provision was, that if a majority of the votes cast on the question were in favor of the law, it became operative, and hence that the law being in force, the inspectors had illegally refused the plaintiff's vote, and were liable on the case stated. Thus Wisconsin antici pated the great constitutional amendment giving negro citizens the right to vote — really in 1849, but practically in 1866. The other case is reported as Druecher v. Solomon (21 Wis. 621). This was an action for false imprisonment. Druecher was charged as being one of a number of rioters who had resisted the draft in 1863. The draft commissioner appointed by the gover nor, under the act of Congress, had been attacked at Port Washington in Ozuakee County, stoned, cruelly beaten and com pelled to flee for his life. His house was
