of twelve. This circumstance must be pure ly accidental. Or, if not, its establishment may be traced to a more remote time. We read in the early Greek poets that twelve was the number of persons who met often to deliberate on important affairs. But admitting that these circumstances are entitled to the weight given them, it is very evident that the customs indicated may still be of Roman origin. The fame and prosperity of the Roman people must have been known to the people of all Europe. Men from every barbarian tribe must have occasionally visited this great city, and carried back to their coun trymen accounts of her manners, customs and habits. In this way her institutions may have been insensibly impressed upon the customs of these rude nations. It is not difficult to imagine that Addison had in view the famous lines of Virgil in summing up the mission of Rome in contrast to the artistic glories of Greece, " Tu regere impe rio populos Romane, memento" when he placed in the mouth of Juba the sentiment of Rome's dominion founded on law: — "A Roman soul is bent on higher views : To civilize the rude, unpolished world, And lay it under the restraint of laws."
Again, there is a remarkable similarity in these customs and the judicial regulations of Rome. By the laws of Alemanni per sons who swore to the innocence of the accused were called noininati or persons named. So the judex or arbiter was either named by the parties or selected by the praetor. The shire-gemot, among the Saxons, determined on the dispute in the first instance, but if the judge doubted, twelve men were chosen who swore to the truth of their decision. Thus among the Romans the praetor acted in the first instance and summoned a jury, who swore to decide according to law and the best of their judgment. By a law of Ethelred the ver dict of a majority of eight of the twelve, selected to expurgate an accused, was con
clusive. Among the Romans the opinion of a majority controlled the judgment; and if the judges were divided equally the praetor decided. When we reflect upon the manner of se lecting the Roman judices, the time during which their authority lasted, and compare them, in these respects, with the regularly appointed judges, we think a striking re semblance exists between them and the jury of the present day. Like most nations of ancient times, judi cial power was exercised by the kings of Rome to the time of their expulsion, A. U. 244. When this event occurred, two su preme magistrates, called praetors, judices and consuls, were created, and performed the duties of judges. The wars in which the nation was engaged devolved the admin istration of justice, in the year A. U. 389, upon the praetor. The influx of foreigners and increase of causes at Rome, in 510, induced the appointment of a second praetor. Because this last officer administered justice to foreigners, and between these and citizens, he was called Praetor Peregrinus. The praetor who performed the functions of judge between citizens of Rome was known as Praetor Urbanas. The praetor possessed a permanent judi cial authority. He was not only the dicta tor of trials, but sometimes the judge himself. When a plaintiff summoned a defendant before the praetor he demanded from this officer a writ suitable to the injury, and also judges of the affair in issue. These judges were: (ist) a judcx or single person who determined the controversy according to the declaration of the law, or the forms prescribed by the praetor; (2d) an arbiter who was not restricted by law or form, but who determined bona ßdc or according to equity; (3d) recuperators, men who first judged between the Romans and foreign states concerning the recovery and restora tion of private property, but who afterwards determined other matters — these three
