Abolish the Death Penalty. mitted therein, since those years. Similar facts in regard to foreign countries, might also be presented were it necessary to do so; but these are sufficient to establish the proposi tion for which I have contended and still con tend, that the abolition of the death penalty wherever it now exists would not have a tendency to increase the number of murders committed therein. There are many other reasons which may be urged in opposition to this method of preventing the crime of murder, and of punishing murderers, only two of which do I care to notice at this time. I believe that our whole system of criminal legislation is based upon an erroneous conception of the true nature of man. It fails to take into consideration the fact that there is a vast diversity in the mental and the moral con stitutions of different individuals; and it makes no allowance whatever for the differ ence in the circumstances by which they are surrounded. On the contrary, it estab lishes an uniform rule of conduct for all of them, and holds each to the same degree of responsibility for its violation, just as though each had the same moral sense and the same strength of character. In support of this opinion it may be stated as a truth, of which all intelligent persons are well aware, that different people inherit from their ancestors widely different natures, for which they are in no wise responsible. One man is born of moral, refined, intellectual, and altogether superior parents; and another is born of parents who are directly opposite to the first mentioned ones in these respects. The former of these two men inherits a nature and a disposition which always prompt him to do right; and the latter inherits a na ture and a disposition which almost always instigate him to do wrong. Again, the first mentioned man is usually surrounded from his infancy throughout his life by the most favorable influences which can be brought to bear upon him, while the lastmentioned one is surrounded through the
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same period by influences of a directly op posite character. Is it not a self-evident proposition that there is a vast disparity in the degree of the moral accountability of these two individuals? and would not a murder committed by the former be a much greater crime than one committed by the latter? And if so, ought there not to be some difference in the kind and in the se verity of the punishment to which these two persons ought to be subjected? And yet the law as it now exists makes not the slightest discrimination in such cases as these; but, on the contrary, it holds these, and all other persons, to the same degree of responsibility, and subjects them to the same treatment. It assumes that all men are free moral agents, and are equally re sponsible for their choice and for their con duct. I hold, however, that man is not a free moral agent, but that he acts under the influence of causes which he did not create, and is controlled by motives which exist in dependently of him, and for which he is in no wise accountable, and that our criminal code ought to take this fact into considera tion and to provide for it. I contend that the idea of vengeance which enters into all of our criminal legislation is not only based upon an erroneous concep tion of the constitution of man, as has been already stated, but is also a relic of a barbar ous age, and is altogether unworthy of the civilization and of the enlightenment of mod ern society. Instead of considering murder ers and other criminals as proper subjects for the visitation of cruel and revengeful chastisements, they ought to be regarded as abnormal or diseased persons, and treated accordingly. Instead of being hanged, elec trocuted, or imprisoned for life at hard labor, they ought to be placed in reformatory in stitutions, and employed at some useful oc cupation; and the compensation for their services ought to be applied to the support of their families, or their dependents; and every possible means should be employed
