decisions; and it is one reason also, though not the only one, for the acknowledged ex cellence of dissenting opinions. After all, the personal element in human affairs is what interests us most; and even in the case of a judicial opinion, what the reader, unconsciously perhaps, most seeks for and especially delights in is not the abstract, impersonal view, but the view which the particular man who wrote the opinion took, and which of course is a little different from that which any other man could possibly take. These minute differences and quali fications are revealed by the niceties and subtleties of a good style; and therefore a good style is almost always a personal as distinguished from an impersonal style. In this respect the opinions rendered by the Hon. John Lowell, who sat for many years, first as district and afterward as circuit judge in the first circuit, are remarkable. These opinions bear the stamp of an original and unconventional nature, and they are, be sides, so concise and well turned that it would hardly be extravagant to call them models of judicial style. Judge Lowell, moreover, never hesitated to acknowledge his difficulty, when he had experienced any, in coming to a conclusion. His opinions abound in such expressions as the following: "The point is a narrow one "; " The case comes near the line"; " After a careful examination of the conflicting evidence, I am inclined to believe, though with some hesitation "; " It is a very doubtful point, and I should be glad to have my decision reviewed," etc. He was even ready to criticize his own former decisions. Thus, in a salvage case, where he had occa sion to compare the sum awarded to the salvors, with the sum awarded by him in a previous case, he said: "I will add that I am not sure that I gave quite enough in that case." On another occasion, when a defen dant had been tried before him and con victed of perjury, Judge Lowell granted a new trial, partly on the ground that his own directions to the jury had not been clear. I
quote what he said upon this point : " There is some difference of opinion in the United States as to whether perjury or false swear ing in the nature of perjury can be com mitted by mere rash and reckless statements on oath; and though my charge, rightly understood, did not authorize the jury to convict the defendant, if the evidence only showed recklessness, yet I am not sure it may not have been understood in that sense. Indeed, I think my own views were not quite distinct upon the point." Nor did Judge Lowell hesitate, as many judges do hesitate, to characterize in frank and appropriate language such fraudulent or unjust conduct as the evidence before him might disclose. A long and important opin ion by him begins as follows : " This case has all the appearance of an attempt to coerce the payment of a disputed debt by an attack on the commercial standing of a trading corpora tion." In another cause, under the admir alty jurisdiction, there was an attempt by a sea captain to defraud his employers of a small amount, and Judge Lowell disposed of it in a characteristic manner. The . "libellant," it must be premised, was the captain of the ship, and this proceeding was brought by him to recover certain sums from the owners : " The respondent pro duced before the assessor, a paper, signed by the libellant, acknowledging to have re ceived one hundred and fifty dollars as the passage money of one Captain Proctor, from Mauritius to New Bedford. The libellant testified that he received in fact but seventyfive dollars for this service; that the price receipted for was the fair price of a firstclass passage, to which Captain Proctor was entitled, but. that the accommodations actu ally furnished him did not come up to that description, and the receipt was given ' for the benefit of Captain Proctor.' This means, I suppose, that Proctor's owners were to pay for the accommodation he ought to have had, and Captain Proctor himself only for what he had. No doubt a receipt is
