Matters went on from bad to worse. Bank ruptcy stared the whole State in the face. In every county the property of debtors was being sold or rather sacrificed under the forms of law, and none could buy but the creditor himself, who fixed his own price. The whole people cried out for pro tection from their own improvident contracts. In those days under the second constitution of the State, the legislature met annually, At the annual elections in 1819 all other lines of distinction were broken down and the candidates arrayed as Relief and AntiRelief. The plan of the Relief candidates was to administer some remedy that would allow the people to escape the consequences of their recklessness and improvidence. The Anti-Relief party, comprising all the creditor class and most of the sober thought of the community, held that to ignore the binding force of the contracts made, would put a premium on dishonesty and would work greater evils than those under which the body politic was then groaning. The Relief party carried the election by a large majority. On December 16, 18 19, the legislature, over Governor Slaughter's veto, passed a stay law absolutely suspending for sixty days the issue of any execution on any judgment and all proceedings on outstanding executions. This was to give time for de vising some plan of relief for debtors. Feb ruary 10, 1820, an act was passed repeal ing the charters of the forty-five " wild-cat" banks that had done so much (as recited in the preamble to the act) to endanger the public safety; but this very just measure came too late. The mischief they were capable of doing had already been done. The next day, and before the sixty days' stay law had run out, an act was passed allowing a two years' replevin on execu tions, unless the plaintiff would endorse on the execution that notes of the Bank of Kentucky would be taken in payment, in which event only twelve months' replevin
would be allowed. This act, by its terms, was to continue for only about one year. It was the first of two acts directly questioned by the Court of Appeals, and while not so bad in effect as the second (for the Bank of Kentucky was comparatively safe) it estab lished a dangerous precedent. At the August elections in 1820 the Relief party was again successful. At its next ses sion the legislature, on November 29th, 1820, chartered the Bank of the Common wealth with the purpose of making money plentiful and of driving out the Bank of Kentucky (which was a conservative in stitution), although the State was a part stockholder. The capital of the new bank was $2,000000.00, owned exclusively by the State. It was authorized to issue notes in double the amount of its capital stock. Its function was to loan money on mortgage to the citizens in the various counties, distributing Its loans on the basis of population. No money was to be loaned in the year 1821, except for the purpose of paying debts or buying stock or produce. The funds of the State, derived from the sale of certain public lands and the unappropriated revenues, were pledged for the payment of the capital stock. All measures of relief thus far having proved ineffectual, on December 25, 1820, the legislature passed another law to give further time to debtors and to help the notes of its new bank to circulate. This act al lowed a further replevin of two years on ex ecutions unless the plaintiff would endorse on the execution that he would take in pay ment either notes of the Bank of Kentucky, or notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth, in event of which endorsement only three months' replevin should be allowed. If only notes of the Bank of Kentucky would be taken, then twelve months' replevin should be allowed. It was further enacted that all executions issued prior to July 1st, 182 1, should remain in the clerk's office for ninety days after date of issue and should be re
