"The treaty-making authority acquires territory by treaty. The power to dispose of it, and the power to admit it into the Union, when formed into States, are both expressly given, and of course if not given could not be exercised. The power to legis late for it is not given; and how, then, can it be exercised? It is clear that the idea of legislation is not included in the idea of acquisition, nor so closely connected with it that the one power cannot be exercised without the other." (Appendix to the Congressional Globe, First Session of the Thirty-first Congress, page 63.) As this is the opinion of one of the most distinguished statesmen and eminent consti tutional lawyers whom this country has pro duced, it ought to remove any possible doubt which may exist in the mind of the reader concerning the truth of the proposition that the right to acquire territory does not neces sarily imply the power either to institute gov ernments over, or to legislate for, the people who reside upon it. To subject either the Filipinos or the Porto Ricans to a government to which they are opposed, is to create a system of slavery over them which is prohibited by our Constitu tion. For although we do not and shall not assume to own them as chattels, any government which we may establish over them, against their protests, will be but a modified form of slavery; for that word does not necessarily imply property in hu man beings, as any person who is entirely subject to the will of another is the slave of that other, although not necessarily his prop erty. The word " slavery " is thus defined by Webster: "Bondage; the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of an other." If, therefore, the people of either of these provinces are to become entirely subject to the will of the citizens of the United States, the former will become the slaves of the latter; and if this clause of the treaty is designed to produce this result, it
is manifestly unconstitutional and therefore an absolute nullity, although the treaty may be valid in other respects. But, conceding for the purpose of the argument, that Congress can rightfully leg islate for the people of Territories which are not a part of the United States, such legis lation must be of the same character as that to which our own citizens are subjected; and, therefore, the people of the Spanish islands above mentioned must be governed according to our own Constitution and laws, and not according to those of Spain. To use the language of the Supreme Court, " It cannot be admitted that the king of Spain could, by treaty or otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have capacity to receive, or power to exer cise them. Every nation acquiring terri tory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to the constitution and laws of its own government, and not according to those of the government ceding it." (Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 Howard, 225.) Conse quently, in so far as the treaty assumes to authorize the United States to establish a government in the Philippine Islands or in Porto Rico which is not republican in form, it is contrary to the fundamental prirrciples upon which this Government was founded; and for us to govern the people of these islands in the same manner in which Spain has heretofore governed them, is to be guilty of gross inconsistency, to say the least. The only proper and consistent course for the United States to pursue in the present instance, is to obtain the consent of these people to be governed by it, before attempt ing to establish a government over them; and in case they refuse to consent to such a government, it ought to withdraw its officers from these islands, allowing them to form their own governments and to become in dependent nations, which they have a per fect right to do.
