irreverent were accustomed to call the " Cir cuit Rider," and yet his travels were but a summer day's journey, compared to those of the leading lawyers of Iredell's time. When the courts opened they followed the judges, from Edenton to Hillsboro, from Hillsboro to Halifax, from Halifax to Salisbury, from Salisbury to Wilmington, and from Wilming ton to New Bern. Their way lay through the wilderness, over swollen rivers, through pestilential swamps, through rain and snow, hailstorm and sunshine, their usual convey ance a one-seated gig, and their lodging place as chance and the fortunes of the road might determine. The duties of his office entailed upon Iredell so much arduous labor and brought with it such small compensation that in 1782, when peace was assured by the sur render of Cornwallis, he resigned to become again what he called " a private lawyer." Cases and clients came to him rapidly, and in July, 1783, he writes his brother that he had a share of practice " very near equal to any lawyer in the country." In 1786, following the passage of the Con fiscation Acts, the question of the power of the court to declare void an act of the Legisla ture because in conflict with the Constitution, was raised in this State by some of the bar and was vigorously supported by Iredell in an exceedingly strong and able pamphlet. In this pamphlet, which was published in the New Bern paper of August 17, 1786, Iredell says : " It will not be denied, I suppose, that the Constitution is a /au> of the State, as well as an act of the Assembly, with this differ ence only, that it is the fundamental law and unalterable by the Legislature, which derives all its powers from it. ... An act of As sembly inconsistent with the Constitution is void, and cannot be obeyed without disobey ing the superior law to which we were pre viously and irrevocably bound." In the celebrated case of Doe on Dem. of Bayard v. Singleton (i Martin, 41, at May Term, 1787), in which Iredell, Johnston and Davie were counsel for plaintiff, and Moore
and Nash for defendant, that question was first discussed and decided in the courts of this State. In reading the report of this case, one is struck with the great and proper re luctance of the judges to approach the deci sion of the point so novel and strange. They suggested to the litigants first one ai»d then another method of compromise and settle ment; but, driven to it at last, they faced the issue as true men. Mr. Haywood, in his argument in Moore v. Bradley (2 Haywood, 140), attributes the merit of that opinion to Judge Ashe, and says that he illustrated his opinion by this forcible language : " As God said to the waters, ' so far shall ye go and no further,' so said the people to the Legisla ture." Afterwards, when upon the Supreme Bench of the United States (in Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas, 386, and again in Chisholm v. Georgia), Iredell took occasion to declare in emphatic language his opinion to be, " If any act of Congress or of the Legislature of a State violates those constitutional provisions, it is unquestionably void; though I admit, that, as the authority to declare it void is of a delicate and awful nature, the court will never resort to that authority but in a clear and urgent case." This doctrine, so clearly and admirably, stated in these few and concise words, is now the law in every State of this Union, and is universally taken to have been so settled by the opinion of Marshall in Marbury v. Madison ( i Cranch, 137). I cannot but think it singular that, in his opinion in this case, Marshall makes no reference what ever to either of the three cases above men tioned or to the earlier cases in Rhode Island and Virginia. The language of Iredell, in Colder v. Bull, is so clear cut and logical that it could not have escaped the notice of the Chief Justice. In our busy life we seldom pause to reflect upon the far-reaching re sults, the inestimable blessings of these deci sions. How often in our history has Congress and Legislature in the mad lust of power and the wild riot of party hate, striving to accom plish unholy and unwholesome legislation,
